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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Inmate Number 61727054 . . . is the best-known prisoner currently held at 
the sprawling [f]ederal [c]orrectional [c]omplex on the outskirts of Butner, North 
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Carolina.”1  He is serving a 150-year sentence2 for stealing between $17 and $30 
billion3 from unknowing investors and pulling off “the biggest Ponzi scheme in 
history.”4  His name is Bernard “Bernie” Madoff (Madoff).  He began his career as 
a legitimate securities broker but transitioned to falsifying trading reports and 
customer statements to reflect false profits.5  He built a fortune by constantly 
raising money from new investors to pay off older investors wanting to cash out 
and keeping the rest for himself and his extravagant lifestyle.  When he was 
exposed, Madoff’s investors were awakened to two harsh realities: the investments 
they thought they owned did not exist, and their principal investment was long 
gone.  
When a securities brokerage firm is exposed as a Ponzi scheme, the law’s 
first goal is to return money to defrauded investors.6  But doing so is not easy; 
figuring out what they are entitled to and where the money should come from is 
complicated.  The massive size of Madoff’s scheme, run through Bernard L. 
Madoff Investment Securities (BLMIS),7 and the many complex transactions 
involved made these determinations even more difficult.8  
                                                
1 Diana B. Henriques, The Wizard of Lies: Bernie Madoff and the Death of Trust XVIII-XXIV 
(2011).    
2 Id.    
3 Madoff ran his scheme for decades, and that, combined with the lack of transparency of his 
operation, makes an exact number of how much he stole from innocent investors impossible to 
calculate.  Lauren Sher, How Much Did Madoff Actually Make Off With?, ABC News (Mar. 6, 2009, 
12:49 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2009/03/how-much-did-ma/.  Adding complexity to 
this issue is the question of whether the amount “stolen” was the amount invested into the scheme, the 
principal, or the amount the fraud operator touted as the total return, profit, and principal.  See generally 
Kathy B. Phelps & Steven Rhodes, The Ponzi Book: A Legal Resource for Unraveling Ponzi Schemes § 
20.04 (1st ed. 2013).  Some have estimated principal losses at $17 billion.  Erik Larson, Madoff Trustee 
Tops $10 Billion Recovery With Bank Deal, Bloomberg (Jan. 8, 2014, 10:23 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-07/madoff-trustee-to-get-543-million-in-jpmorgan-
accord.html.  
4 Henriques, supra note 1.  
5 Madoff was also running his operation as an unregistered investment advisor.  Liz Moyer, How 
Regulators Missed Madoff, Forbes (Jan. 27, 2009, 3:20 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/27/ 
bernard-madoff-sec-business-wall-street_0127_regulators.html (“Madoff’s firm [was not] even 
registered as an investment advisor until 2006.”).  
6 In the bankruptcy of a business that is not a securities brokerage, secured creditors are paid before 
unsecured creditors.  Charles J. Tabb, the Law of Bankruptcy 70 (2nd ed. 2009).  Customers of a 
securities broker-dealer are considered unsecured creditors.  Id. (“Once the estate is reduced to money, 
the trustee must make distribution to creditors . . . . [S]ecured creditors will either be given their 
collateral or will be paid the value of that collateral.  Unsecured creditors holding allowed claims will 
then be paid in the order specified by [11 U.S.C. § 726].”).  As will be seen later in this note, customers 
of a securities broker-dealer are given a higher priority in liquidation than they would be in a typical 
bankruptcy proceeding. 
7 In the bankruptcy context, the organization or person who enters bankruptcy, either voluntarily or 
involuntarily, is referred to as the “debtor.”  See generally Tabb, supra note 6. 
8 This process is still not complete.  Many investors have yet to see their claims fully processed by 
the trustee.  For example, a recent press release from the attorney representing Mr. Picard stated “the 
SIPA Trustee [Mr. Picard] anticipates recovering additional assets through litigation and settlements.  
Final resolution of certain disputes will permit the SIPA Trustee to further reduce the reserves he is 
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A liquidating trustee, Irving Picard (Picard), was appointed to wind BLMIS 
up.9  He determines who gets what and where the money should come from.10  The 
law provides a framework for getting money back to customers, primarily through 
fraudulent transfer lawsuits—sometimes called “claw back” suits—and the sale of 
assets.  However, statutes of limitations and other restrictions often make total 
recovery impossible.  The Madoff case is no exception; however, Picard has 
exercised zealous advocacy to explore other options of recovering money for 
defrauded investors.11  One of his efforts is the subject of this case note: Picard v. 
JPMorgan.12  
In the case, Picard sued numerous financial institutions that made money 
through routine transactions and investments with BLMIS, alleging they knew 
about, or should have known about, the fraud, and they breached many duties by 
not informing regulators.13  Picard argued these firms should not keep the money 
and fees they made from Madoff at the expense of innocent investors.14  He failed 
to mention these firms lost money in the scheme and had already been subjected to 
fraudulent transfer lawsuits. 
What makes the Picard case notable is Picard brought many of the claims on 
behalf of defrauded investors.  The general rule is a trustee only has standing to sue 
on behalf of the debtor—here, BLMIS.15  As such, the Federal District Court for 
the Southern District of New York dismissed Picard for lack of standing.16  Picard 
argued to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals the Securities Investor Protection 
Act (SIPA) and section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code) gave him standing.  
The Second Circuit rejected these arguments.17  Picard appealed to the United 
                                                
required to maintain, which will allow him to make additional distributions to customers in the future.”  
The Madoff Recovery Initiative, http://www.madofftrustee.com/twitter-feed47.html?post=17#.VH6I 
D2TF8zE (last visited Dec. 2, 2014).  See generally The Madoff Recovery Initiative, 
MADOFFTRUSTEE.COM, http://www.madofftrustee.com/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2014).  
9 “The process of settling accounts and liquidating assets in anticipation of a partnership’s or a 
corporation’s dissolution.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1738 (9th ed. 2009). 
10 The bankruptcy court must approve many of the actions a bankruptcy trustee takes.  For example, 
the decisions of how to calculate who gets what amount, the plan to distribute property, and the decision 
to claw back money.  See generally TABB, supra note 6. 
11 A bankruptcy trustee has a fiduciary obligation to maximize the money recovered for the estate of 
the debtor.  Stephen Rhodes, The Fiduciary and Institutional Obligations of a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy 
Trustee, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 147, 164–65 (2006) (“[A] trustee is required to maximize the distribution 
of the estate.”).  
12 In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Secs. LLC., 721 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 2013) (hearing two 
consolidated district court cases).  
13 JPMorgan settled with Picard.  See Larson, supra note 3.   
14 See infra note 192.  
15 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 548.48 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2014) 
(“A trustee lacks standing to assert claims of creditors against third parties who are alleged to bear 
responsibility for the debtor’s losses.”); Id. at SP2-Monograph 2, Section 4 (“[Generally,] the trustee 
does not have standing to bring actions on behalf of individual creditors.”).  
16 Picard v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 460 B.R. 84, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  
17 In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Secs. LLC., 721 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 2013).  
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States Supreme Court, and, as of this writing, his writ is pending before the Court. 
Picard’s writ argued there is a circuit split concerning the standing of a 
trustee to sue third parties under both SIPA and 544 of the Code.18  He argued the 
Second Circuit was on the wrong side of these splits, reading the law more 
narrowly than other circuits.19  In the alternative, he argued, if the statutes are silent 
on standing in this case, the interests of defrauded customers should prevail over 
financial institutions that made millions.20   
An objective analysis of Picard’s writ shows the Second Circuit should be 
affirmed.  Picard’s arguments are long on emotional appeal and customer-centric 
public policy but short on the law.  The Second Circuit decision is in line with the 
intent of Congress.  Furthermore, adopting Picard’s interpretation would raise 
many issues and create many problems in the financial services industry.  Part II of 
this note provides background on SIPA and the Securities Investor Protection 
Corporation (SIPC), as well as Section 544 of the Code.21  Part III provides 
background on the Picard case, including a brief discussion of Madoff’s scheme 
and Picard’s work to recover money for investors.22  Part IV outlines the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Picard,23 and Part V dissects and analyzes Picard’s Supreme 
Court writ.24  Part VI comments on the implications of affirming the Second 
Circuit.25 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND  
A. Ponzi Schemes 
Charles Ponzi spent his life looking for a get-rich-quick scheme.26  In 1919, 
he invented one.  He planned to speculate on international reply coupons27 and 
make wild profits.28  However, as soon as he began, investor money in hand, he 
                                                
18 See infra Part V and accompanying notes 209–98.  
19 Id.  
20 Id.  
21 See infra Part II and accompanying notes 26–76. 
22 See infra Part III and accompanying notes 77–131. 
23 See infra Part IV and accompanying notes 132–208. 
24 See infra Part V and accompanying notes 209–298. 
25 See infra Part VI and accompanying notes 299–303. 
26 Ponzi, after his first prison stint, “was as eager to get rich . . . with one of the many plans he had 
cooked up in prison.” MITCHELL ZUCKOFF, PONZI’S SCHEME: THE TRUE STORY OF A FINANCIAL 
LEGEND 51 (Random House Publishing Group 2005). 
27 “In April 1906, [multiple nations] gathered in Rome with the goal of making it easier to send mail 
across national borders[,] . . . [so they] created a system of international postal currency, paper that held 
a fixed value from one country to the next and could be redeemed for stamps in any post office of a 
country belonging to [the participating nations].  They called the currency they created International 
Reply Coupons.”  Id. at 93–96  
28 Ponzi’s model was based on sending funds to a contact in Barcelona, who would send coupons 
back, and, by “redeeming them in Boston[,] . . . Ponzi would earn a profit before expenses of ten cents, 
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learned the law29 and the limited volume of stamps available made a profitable 
business improbable.30  That did not stop Ponzi from collecting investors’ money 
for his idea and alluring them with fifty percent interest every forty-five days.31  If 
investors came calling after that time, Ponzi would implore them to leave their 
money with him and compound another fifty percent.  If the investors declined, he 
would give them the money of a fresh investor, flaunted as “profits.”  To his many 
skeptics, Ponzi said it would be impossible to sustain his lifestyle and pay investors 
their earnings if he was a scam.  In reality, his lifestyle and investor payouts were 
paid for with the money of others.32  
By 1920, when news got out Ponzi was being investigated for fraud, hoards 
of investors came clamoring for their money back, and Ponzi’s insolvency was 
exposed.33  In 1920, Ponzi was convicted of fraud.34  In only “eight months he took 
in $9,582,000, for which he issued his [promissory] notes for $14,374,000. . . . He 
made no [legitimate] investments of any kind.”35  The Ponzi scheme was born.36  
Today, despite their notoriety,37 Ponzi schemes are alive and well38 and commonly 
include the same red flags.39  
                                                
or 10 percent, on each dollar’s worth of coupons he bought.”  Id. at 95.  
29 The postal service, in response to a letter from Ponzi asking about the coupons, said: “You are 
advised that International Reply Coupons are issued . . . for use in pre-paying international reply 
postage.  To effect that purpose they must be exchanged for stamps of foreign countries[,] . . . [t]hey are 
not intended as a medium of speculation, and the department cannot sanction their use for that purpose.”  
Id. at 120–21.  
30 The postal service was concerned about Ponzi, so “the Italian postal officials abruptly suspended 
sales of reply coupons [in 1919].  Their counterparts in France and Romania quickly followed.”  Id. at 
125.  
31 Id. at 8.  
32 See In re Manhattan Inv. Fund Ltd., 397 B.R. 1, 8 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[A Ponzi scheme operator 
uses] money from new investors . . . to pay artificially high returns to earlier investors in order to create 
an appearance of profitability and attract new investors.”).  
33 See generally ZUCKOFF, supra note 26. 
34 Id. 
35 Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 8 (1924) (discussing Charles Ponzi).  
36 Before Ponzi, this scheme was known as “robbing Peter to pay Paul.”  ZUCKOFF, supra note 26, 
at 106.  
37 Avoiding Investment Scams, FINRA.ORG (2013) http://www.finra.org/web/groups/investors/@inv/ 
@protect/@ia/documents/investors/p125862.pdf. 
38 See Jeff Sommer, The Bridges Are New, but Business Scams Are Timeless, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 29, 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/your-money/the-bridges-are-new-but-business-scams-are-
timeless.html; Stephen Greenspan, Why We Keep Falling for Financial Scams, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 
2009, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB123093987596650197; Jessica D. Gabel, Midnight in the 
Garden of Good Faith: Using Clawback Actions to Harvest the Equitable Roots of Bankrupt Ponzi 
Schemes, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 19, 77 (2011) (“[There] is no shortage of Ponzi schemes [today].  In 
the first six months of 2011 alone, forty-five possible Ponzi schemes [were] reported.”).  
39 Sandra S. Benson, Recognizing The Red Flags Of A Ponzi Scheme, CURRENT ACCOUNTS, Nov-
Dec. 2009, available at http://www.gscpa.org/Content/Files/Pdfs/Current%20Accounts/CANovDec09 
.pdf. 
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B. SIPA and SIPC 
In the late 1960s, a sudden market downturn forced many securities broker-
dealers into insolvency.40  This not only struck a blow to the economy,41 but 
investors who had securities on deposit with defunct firms were forced into lengthy 
bankruptcy proceedings.42  This undermined confidence in the securities market.43  
To restore that confidence and support the securities industry, Congress passed 
SIPA in 1970.44  SIPA’s primary goal was, and still is, to engender confidence in 
securities brokers45 by giving their customers first priority in bankruptcy46 and 
                                                
40 On April 25, 1978, Hugh F. Owens, then Chairman of the Securities Investor Protection 
Corporation commented to Congress:  
 
SIPA had its origins in the difficult years of 1968-1970 when the paper crunch brought 
on by an unexpectedly high trading volume in securities was followed by the most 
severe decline in stock prices since the Great Depression.  Hundreds of broker/dealers 
were merged, acquired or simply went out of business.  Some were unable to meet 
their obligations to their customers and went bankrupt.  Public confidence in our 
securities markets was in jeopardy.  
 
Securities Investor Protection Act Amendments: Hearing Before the Senate Subcommittee on Securities 
of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 10–11 (1978) (statement of Hugh 
F. Owens, Chairman of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation), available at http://archive. 
org/stream/securitiesinves00secugoog/securitiesinves00secugoog_djvu.txt [hereinafter Securities 
Investor Protection Act Amendments]. 
41 Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 415 (1975) (“[T]his [failure] also threatened a 
‘domino effect’ involving otherwise solvent brokers that had substantial open transactions with firms 
that failed.”). 
42 Id. (“Following a period of great expansion in the 1960’s, the securities industry experienced a 
business contraction that led to the failure or instability of a significant number of brokerage firms.  
Customers of failed firms found their cash and securities on deposit either dissipated or tied up in 
lengthy bankruptcy proceedings.”).  
43 H.R. REP NO. 91-1613, at 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5254, 5255 (“[T]he serious 
and persistent financial problems besetting the securities industry in recent months have led to the 
voluntary liquidations, mergers, receiverships or, less frequently, bankruptcies of a substantial number 
of brokerage houses.  Such failures may lead to loss of customers’ funds and securities with an 
inevitable weakening of confidence in the U.S. securities markets.”); Douglas C. Michael, Self-
Regulation for Safety and Security: Final Minutes or Finest Hour?, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 1075, 
1115–16 ( “[I]n 1967 . . . [a]n increasing volume of stock trades coupled with outdated settlement and 
clearing processes, followed by a significant market slump from 1969 to 1970 . . . resulted in an 
unprecedented number of brokerage firm failures . . . [which created] loss of investor confidence [in the 
securities market] . . . .”). 
44 PL 91-598, December 30, 1970, 84 Stat. 1636; 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5254, 5255 (“The primary 
purpose of the reported bill is to provide protection for investors if the broker-dealer with whom they 
are doing business encounters financial troubles.  In these circumstances public customers sometimes 
encounter difficulty in obtaining their cash balances or securities from the broker-dealers.  Sometimes it 
is just a matter of time until the liquidation is completed, but, unfortunately, in some situations the 
customer never fully recovers that to which he is entitled.  The proposed legislation would provide for 
the establishment of a fund to be used to make it possible for the public customers in the event of the 
financial insolvency of their broker, to recover that to which they are entitled, with a limitation . . . for 
each customer on the amounts to be provided by the proposed fund.”).  
45 Barbour, 421 U.S. at 415 (“Following a period of great expansion in the 1960’s, the securities 
industry experienced a business contraction that led to the failure or instability of a significant number 
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covering47 losses caused by broker-dealer insolvency, up to a statutory cap.48  Fees 
assessed on members of the securities industry fund this.49  The fund only protects 
customers when their broker becomes insolvent; it is not insurance.  The SIPC, a 
non-profit organization,50 was established by Congress to manage the fund and 
related legal issues.   
In 1978, Congress amended SIPA in two major respects.  First, it increased 
the amount of protection customers may receive, so the amount today is 
                                                
of brokerage firms.  Customers of failed firms found their cash and securities on deposit either 
dissipated or tied up in lengthy bankruptcy proceedings.  In addition to its disastrous effects on 
customer assets and investor confidence, this situation also threatened a ‘domino effect’ involving 
otherwise solvent brokers that had substantial open transactions with firms that failed.  Congress 
enacted the SIPA to arrest this process, restore investor confidence in the capital markets, and upgrade 
the financial responsibility requirements for registered brokers and dealers.”).  In creating an insurance 
system for broker-dealers, SIPA arguably shifted the burden of responsibility away from broker-dealers 
and encouraged them to be more risky.  See Thomas W. Joo, Who Watches the Watchers? The 
Securities Investor Protection Act, Investor Confidence, and the Subsidization of Failure, 72 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1071, 1075 (1999) (“[A]llocating the risk of losses due to failure to the parties best able to avoid 
such loss is a more efficient means to the long-term protection of customers, as well as the long-term 
health of the industry.”).  
46 Mishkin v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 744 F. Supp. 531, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“The basic 
scheme of SIPA is to create a preferred class of creditors.  Investors who had left identifiable securities 
in their name with the broker-dealer or who had left cash balances to be used for investment purposes 
with the broker-dealer [which together are referred to as ‘net equity claims’] are entitled to receive such 
securities and cash from the liquidator before other creditors may share in the estate.”); Lopez v. 
Zaremba, NO. 3:08CV01132, 2009 U.S. Dist. WL 36617, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 5, 2009) (“A SIPA 
liquidation procedure is ‘essentially a bankruptcy proceeding’ for financially troubled broker-dealers.  
In this liquidation, ‘customers’ of insolvent securities broker-dealers receive preference over general 
creditors in the distribution of a fund designated customer property.”) (citations omitted).  
47 The SIPC fund is not technically an “insurance” fund because it does not protect against any 
situation, only broker-dealer insolvency; does not protect all money, typically only the principal; and 
there are many restrictions on customer claims.  COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 15, at 12.16 
(“Payments from the SIPC Fund are in the form of advances to the trustee, followed by distributions by 
the trustee to eligible claimants.  This allows customers to receive securities or cash prior to a 
determination of each customer’s ratable share and prior to a complete marshaling of customer 
property.1 A SIPC advance can only satisfy customer claims for the amount by which a customer’s net 
equity exceeds his ratable share of customer property.  Advances from the SIPC fund are not 
insurance to customers.”).  
48 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-3 (2010) (“SIPC shall advance to the trustee such moneys, not to exceed 
$500,000 for each customer, as may be required to pay or otherwise satisfy claims for the amount by 
which the net equity of each customer exceeds his ratable share of customer property . . . .”).  
49 All those who are registered as broker-dealers under the Securities Act are required to be 
members of SIPC.  15 U.S.C. § 78ccc (2010) (“[A]ll persons registered as brokers or dealers under 
section 78o(b) of” Title 15.”).  Today, members of the SIPC are assessed at a fee that equals .0025% of 
their net operating revenue.  Assessment Rate, SIPC.ORG (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.sipc.org/for-
members/assessment-rate. 
50 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc (2010) (“SIPC shall be a nonprofit corporation . . . [and] not be an agency or 
establishment of the United States Government.”); see Daniel J. Morse, When A Securities Brokerage 
Firm Goes Broke A Primer on the Securities Investment Protection Act of 1970, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 
34, (2006) (“SIPC is a nonprofit private membership corporation to which almost all brokers and 
dealers registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 belong.  SIPC is neither an agency nor an 
establishment of the federal government.”).  15 U.S.C. § 78ddd (2010) sets out the rules for SIPC’s 
assessment of fees and accompanying limitations on its power to do so.  
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$500,000,51 with a cash limit of $250,000,52 and, second, it allowed customers to 
be compensated in the form of securities.53  The purpose of the second change was 
“to achieve better, faster[,] and more efficient methods of investor protection.”54  
Since 1970, the SIPC has distributed more than $2 billion to customers of insolvent 
broker-dealers, is currently staffed by approximately forty people,55 and the fund 
sits around $1.5 billion.56  The board represents both governmental and industry 
interests.57 
If a securities broker becomes insolvent, SIPA can elect to manage the 
liquidation.58  If the SIPC chooses to do so,59 it appoints a trustee, and the Code 
generally governs.60  The trustee is “charged with assessing claims [of brokerage 
                                                
51 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-3 (2010) (“[T]o provide for prompt payment and satisfaction of net equity 
claims of customers of the debtor, SIPC shall advance to the trustee such moneys, not to exceed 
$500,000 for each customer . . . .”).  
52 About SIPC, History and Track Record, SIPC.ORG, http://www.sipc.org/about-sipc/history (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2014). 
53 Kenneth J. Caputo, Customer Claims In SIPA Liquidations: Claims Filing And The Impact Of 
Ordinary Bankruptcy Standards On Post-Bar Date Claim Amendments In SIPA Proceedings, 20 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 235, 235 (2012) (“The Securities Investor Protection Act [(1)] authorizes the 
court-appointed trustee in a SIPA proceeding to transfer customer accounts to another viable brokerage 
firm, and the transfer may be facilitated by funding advances from the Securities Investor Protection 
Corporation.  [(2)] Thus, where the books and records of the brokerage firm are complete and accurate, 
customer accounts may be transferred efficiently, and the vast majority of customers will suffer no ill 
consequences as a result of the firm’s financial failure or insolvency.”).  
54 Securities Investor Protection Act Amendments, supra note 40. 
55 Annual Report, SIPC.ORG (2012) http://www.sipc.org/Content/media/annual-reports/2012-
annual-report.PDF (“The SIPC staff, numbering 39, initiates the steps leading to the liquidation of a 
member, advises the trustee, his counsel and accountants, reviews claims, audits distributions of 
property, and carries out other activities pertaining to the Corporation’s purposes.”) [hereinafter Annual 
Report].  
56 About the SIPC; The SIPC Fund, SIPC.ORG http://www.sipc.org/about-sipc/the-sipc-fund (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2014).  
57 Annual Report, supra note 55 (“[A] board of seven directors determines policies and governs 
operations.  Five directors are appointed by the President of the United States subject to Senate 
approval.  Three of the five represent the securities industry and two are from the general public.  One 
director is appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury and one by the Federal Reserve Board from 
among the officers and employees of those organizations.  The Chairman and the Vice Chairman are 
designated by the President from the public directors.”).  
58 The alternatives are for liquidation under the Bankruptcy Code.  See PHELPS & RHODES, supra 
note 3, at 1.03[3]–[4].  See generally 11 U.S.C.  §§ 101–1532 (2010); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78eee (2010) 
(“SIPC may, upon notice to a member of SIPC, file an application for a protective decree with any court 
of competent jurisdiction.”). 
59 Patrick M. Birney & Travis R. Searles, Should Sipa Trustee Have Greater Power Than Chapter 7 
Trustee to Pursue Third-Party Claims?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2012, at 30 (“The SIPA liquidation 
proceeding is typically commenced by SIPC filing an application with a federal district court for a 
protective decree after being alerted that a firm is in or is approaching financial difficulty.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
60 15 U.S.C.A. § 78eee (2010) (“If the court issues a protective decree under paragraph (1), such 
court shall forthwith appoint, as trustee for the liquidation of the business of the debtor and as attorney 
for the trustee, such persons as SIPC, in its sole discretion, specifies.  The persons appointed as trustee 
and as attorney for the trustee may be associated with the same firm.  SIPC may, in its sole discretion, 
specify itself or one of its employees as trustee in any case in which SIPC has determined that the 
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customers], recovering and distributing customer property to [the debtor’s] 
customers, and liquidating the assets of [the debtor] for the benefit of the estate and 
its creditors.”61  A trustee under SIPA is given the same powers and authority as a 
trustee under the Code.62  Once a trustee is appointed, there are many issues to sort 
out: who are the customers of the broker-dealer, 63 what amounts are they entitled 
to,64 and who received what and when?  
A trustee’s primary goal, which is oftentimes elusive, 65 is to make creditors 
whole.66  First, money is provided by the trustee, in the form of cash or securities, 
to customers through the SIPC fund.67  If customers claim they are entitled to more, 
they have to wait for the trustee to recover assets.68  There are many ways to do 
                                                
liabilities of the debtor to unsecured general creditors and to subordinated lenders appear to aggregate 
less than $750,000 and that there appear to be fewer than five hundred customers of such debtor.”).  
61 Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 429 B.R. 423, 426 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2010) aff’d sub nom. In re Madoff, 848 F. Supp. 2d 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) aff’d sub nom. In re 
Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 740 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2014). 
62 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-1 (2010) (“[A] trustee shall be vested with the same powers and title with 
respect to the debtor and the property of the debtor, including the same rights to avoid preferences, as a 
trustee in a case under Title 11.”).  Additionally, a SIPA-appointed trustee has the following general 
authority to: 
  
deliver securities to or on behalf of customers to the maximum extent practicable in 
satisfaction of customer claims for securities of the same class and series of an issuer; 
and subject to the prior approval of SIPC but without any need for court approval, pay or 
guarantee all or any part of the indebtedness of the debtor to a bank, lender, or other 
person if the trustee determines that the aggregate market value of securities to be made 
available to the trustee upon the payment or guarantee of such indebtedness does not 
appear to be less than the total amount of such payment or guarantee. 
 
Id. 
63 See PHELPS & RHODES, supra note 3, at 20.06[2][b] (“[A] claimant is entitled to SIPA protection 
if he is a ‘customer,’ as that term is defined by SIPA in 15 U.S.C. § 78lll(2).”).    
64 Id. at 20.06[3] (“There are two competing methods for calculating an investor’s Net Equity-the 
Net Investment Method and the Last Statement Method.”).  
65 Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 776 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A]ssets recovered after a collapsed Ponzi 
scheme typically are insufficient to satisfy claims by defrauded investors.”).  
66 Hon. Steven Rhodes, The Fiduciary and Institutional Obligations of A Chapter 7 Bankruptcy 
Trustee, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 147, 218 (2006) (“The trustee’s duty is to maximize the assets of the 
bankruptcy estate to allow maximum recovery for . . . creditors”) (quoting United States v. Sims, 218 
F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 2000)).  
67 Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, No. 08-01789-BRL, slip. op. at 5 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2008) available at http://www.madofftrustee.com/document/other/Docket% 
20No%200000012%20.PDF (“ORDERED, that the Trustee be, and he hereby is, authorized to satisfy 
such customer claims and accounts (i) by delivering to a customer entitled thereto ‘customer name 
securities,’ as defined in 15 U.S.C. §78lll(3); (ii) by satisfying a customer’s ‘net equity’ claim, as 
defined in 15 U.S.C. §78lll(11), by distributing on a ratable basis securities of the same class or series of 
an issue on hand as ‘customer property,’ as defined in 15 U.S.C. §78lll(4), and, if necessary, by 
distributing cash from such customer property or cash advanced by SIPC, or purchasing securities for 
customers as set forth in 15 U.S.C. §78fff-2(d) within the limits set forth in 15 U.S.C. §78fff-3(a); 
and/or (iii) by completing contractual commitments where required pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §78fff-2(e) 
and SIPC’s Series 300 Rules, 17 C.F.R.  §300.300 et seq., promulgated pursuant thereto.”).  
68 How the Claims Process Works, SIPC.ORG http://www.sipc.org/cases-and-claims/how-the-
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this,69 but hunting down assets transferred away by the debtor is the first method.70  
The law provides, when someone received assets from a Ponzi scheme and knew 
of the fraud, he or she has to give it all back, within a statute of limitations.71  The 
law also provides, even if a party did not know of the fraud, he or she must give 
back the amount above principal.72  This process is known as the avoidance of 
fraudulent transfers, and colloquially called a claw back.73   
Second, the sale of assets is useful.  However, in Ponzi schemes, few assets 
remain compared to the debt.74  After pursuing claw backs, selling assets, and other 
                                                
claims-process-works (last visited Oct. 1, 2014). 
69 In a typical SIPA liquidation, the accounts of the debtor are transferred to another securities firm.  
See Morse, supra note 50, at 34 (“When practicable, the trustee will use the funds advanced by SIPC to 
buy securities of the same class and series as those owed to the customer.”).  
70 See e.g., Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[The receiver was only able to 
recover] $12 million [at first,] consisting mainly of property [that the Ponzi scheme operator] had 
bought with money that he had siphoned from the corporations, which in turn had obtained the money 
from the sale of shares in the limited partnerships.  The receiver [then] distributed the recovered funds 
to the investors in the Ponzi scheme who lost money, with the result that, thus far, each has recovered 
40 percent of his losses.”).  
71 The law says all payments made from a Ponzi scheme to an investor are subject to being returned 
to the trustee; however, “a transferee has a defense to avoidance to the extent that value was given in 
good faith.”  COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 15, at 548.04.  Lacking, this good faith, all money 
is required to be returned.  See generally Mark A. McDermott, Ponzi Schemes and the Law of 
Fraudulent and Preferential Transfers, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 157 (1998).  
72 McDermott, supra note 71 (“Amounts received in excess of the amounts investments, however, 
are uniformly held to be subject to recovery.”); see also Scholes, 56 F.3d at 757–758 (“The injustice in 
allowing [an investor] to retain his profit at the expense of the defrauded investors is avoided by 
insisting on commensurability of consideration.  [The investor] is entitled to his profit only if the 
payment of that profit to him, which reduced the net assets of the estate now administered by the 
receiver, was offset by an equivalent benefit to the estate . . . [However, a] profit is not offset by 
anything; it is the residuum of income that remains when costs are netted against revenues . . . 
[Furthermore] [i]t is no answer that some or for that matter all of [the investor’s] profit may have come 
from “legitimate” trades made by the corporations.  They were not legitimate.  The money used for the 
trades came from investors gulled by fraudulent representations.  [The investor in this case] was one of 
those investors, and it may seem “only fair” that he should be entitled to the profits on trades made with 
his money.  That would be true as between him and [the debtor] . . . It is not true as between him and 
either the creditors of or the other investors in the corporations.  He should not be permitted to benefit 
from a fraud at their expense merely because he was not himself to blame for the fraud.  All he is being 
asked to do is to return the net profits of his investment[—]the difference between what he put in at the 
beginning and what he had at the end.”).  
73 Scholes, 56 F.3d at 757 (“[A winning investor] should not be permitted to benefit from a fraud at 
[losing investors’] expense merely because he was not himself to blame for the fraud.”); see also, 
Jordan Maglich, Up Next For ZeekRewards Ponzi Scheme Victims . . . Clawbacks?, FORBES (Aug. 27, 
2012, 8:33 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jordanmaglich/2012/08/27/up-next-for-zeekrewards-
ponzi-scheme-victims-clawbacks/ (“A receivership is founded on principles of equity.  Because the 
amount of assets ultimately available for distribution to victims is usually insufficient to satisfy the total 
amount of victim claims, the receiver is tasked with ensuring that any distribution treats similarly-
situated victims alike.  This includes ensuring that some victims do not receive or retain gains at the 
expense of other victims.”).   
74 Many Ponzi scheme operators, such as Charles Ponzi and Bernie Madoff, spent the money of 
investors on lavish lifestyles, so there are little actual securities sitting around for the benefit of 
creditors.  
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recovery methods,75 it is not uncommon for customers to only get a percentage of 
their investment back.  The trustee only has the power to recover money while 
standing in the shoes of the debtor; the Code generally does not provide standing 
for the trustee to pursue claims on behalf of creditors.76  However, customers are 
obviously free to pursue their own legal actions against third parties who they 
believe aided or abetted fraud.  
III. PICARD V. JPMORGAN 
A. Madoff’s Scheme  
Madoff was born in 1938 in Queens, New York.77  He started BLMIS in 
1960, in his senior year of college at Hofstra.78  He started out as a market maker 
and did fairly well. 79  In the 1970s, his firm developed cutting edge technology that 
made Madoff a name.80  In the late 1980s, the market crashed.  Many believe 
Madoff could have legitimately continued to return the high profits he boasted 
through that period.81  Most commentators agree, he began running a Ponzi 
scheme82 through a below-the-radar investment advisory business in the late 
1980s.83 
                                                
75 See generally TABB, supra note 6.  
76 “A chapter 7 trustee does not have standing to pursue any cause of action on behalf of the estate’s 
creditors.”  Birney & Searles, supra note 59, at 30.  
77 HENRIQUES, supra note 1, at 31.  
78 Id. 
79 “Madoff securities was a well-known market maker, meaning he both bought and sold stocks, 
making his profit by selling for a few cents more per share than his purchase price.”  HARRY 
MARAKOPOLOS, NO ONE WOULD LISTEN: A TRUE FINANCIAL 26 (Frank Casey et al. eds., 1st ed. 2010).  
80 “Madoff securities was a pioneer in electronic trading, enabling the company to more rapidly 
move large blocks of over-the-counter stocks.”  Id.  
81 “Madoff was one of the few broker-dealers who stayed open for business during the crash of 
1987.”  ERIN ARVEDLUND, TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE: THE RISE AND FALL OF BERNIE MADOFF, at Kindle 
Locations 986-87 (Portfolio Kindle ed. 2009). 
82 When he pled guilty, Madoff said: “When I began my Ponzi scheme, I believed it would end 
shortly and I would be able to extricate myself and my clients from the scheme.”  Id. at Kindle 
Locations 84–87.  
83 Id.:     
 
 [In] the 1980s and 1990s, more and more money was pouring in to Madoff’s illegitimate 
advisory operation [and] . . . Madoff continued to use the success of his legitimate firm to 
dupe his victims and the SEC.  He would wave papers from the legitimate broker-dealer 
business in front of them to deceive them into thinking he was making real trades . . . [but 
h]e was simply taking investors’ money, depositing [it into his account,] . . . and sending 
it back out to earlier investors . . . Although the advisory business was growing, it was 
illegal [because Madoff was a registered investment advisor,] so Madoff did not like to 
talk about it.  
 
 Id. at Kindle Locations 1374–84.  
298 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. VIII:I 
 
Too ashamed to show bad performance,84 Madoff produced false trade 
reports and customer account statements.85  Few within BLMIS knew what was 
really going on.86  Investors saw high returns on their statements and kept their 
money with Madoff.87  They had no idea the securities they thought they owned 
did not exist in their accounts.88  When an investor asked to liquidate his or her 
account, Madoff would provide the money of another investor, touted as “profit.”89  
This is a classic Ponzi scheme,90 and the key to maintaining it is to recruit new 
investors and convince as many current investors as possible to keep their money 
in and “accrue interest.”91  
Madoff used an aura of financial sophistication92 to recruit new money, both 
directly and through feeder funds.93  A feeder fund is “a fund that raises money 
                                                
84 HENRIQUES, supra note 1, at 93 (“It is the classic genesis of a Ponzi scheme on Wall Street.  A 
money manager falls short of cash to cover some expense or placate some customer or deliver on some 
promise, and he steals a little money from client accounts. The rationale is that he will be able to pay off 
his theft before it is detected . . . More typically, the sum of stolen money grows much faster than the 
honest profits do, and the Ponzi scheme rolls on towards certain destruction.”).  
85 One author explained the Madoff scheme this way:  
 
To perpetuate the fraud, Madoff would keep accounts for all of his investors and show 
them  statements containing fictitious profits made from securities trades.  But in reality, 
Madoff was not making any trades at all.  He simply recruited individuals to invest in his 
firm, and then used  their money to pay other investors when requests for distribution of 
‘profits’ were made.  Eventually, the  money began to dry up as people began taking 
much more out than was coming  in via new investments.  In the end, the market that 
Madoff had dominated for decades finally  destroyed him.  The burst of the  housing 
bubble in 2008 and the resultant global financial  crisis spelled the end for [the Ponzi 
scheme].  The jig, as they say, was up. 
 
Anthony Martucci, Advocating for Asset Forfeiture in the Post-Madoff Era: Why the Government, Not 
A Bankruptcy Trustee, Should Be Responsible for Recovering and Redistributing Assets from Feeder 
Funds and Net Winners, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 602–03 (2012) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
86 For example, the London office of the Madoff operation was determined to be innocent of fraud 
and to not have been aware of the Ponzi scheme in the United States.  Peter Lattman, Case Against 
Madoff Sons Is Dismissed in London, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/ 
10/18/madoffs-sons-cleared-in-london-trial/. 
 87 Martucci, supra note 85, at 603. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Martucci, supra note 85.  
91 HENRIQUES, supra note 1, at 93 (“As long as most of his clients left their balances intact, ‘rolling 
over’ their reported profits and making few if any withdrawals, he could pay out the occasional 
disbursement from the flood of new money coming in.”).  
92 For example, Madoff was chairman of the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotations (NASDAQ) and donated generously to numerous charities and political campaigns. Building 
this aura is common to those running Ponzi schemes, who are more interested in building up their image 
than in sharing the details of how they are achieving their success.  See Steven M. Davidoff,, Should 
Charities Repay Their Madoff Money?, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2009, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/ 
06/29/should-charities-repay-their-madoff-money/.  
93 MARKOPOLOS, supra note 79, at 112 (“[The feeder funds] did nothing for their clients except 
shovel money directly to Madoff.”).  
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from investors and puts it into one or more other funds.94  Feeder funds raising cash 
to invest with Madoff would proliferate [rapidly] . . . after 1990.”95  The logic for 
using feeder funds is to both raise money and keep prying eyes of investors and 
regulators at arm’s length.96  
Many people had suspicions about Madoff; two in particular stand out.  The 
first was Harry Markopolos.  Markopolos, while working as a securities analyst at 
Rampart Investment Management in Boston, was asked to recreate Madoff’s 
methods.97  At that time, Madoff was publicly saying he employed a split-strike-
conversion strategy, but Markopolos could not replicate Madoff’s results and “saw 
no reason why Madoff would let his feeder funds reap the huge management fees 
while he got only the trading commissions.  [Additionally, Markopolos] doubted 
there were enough index options in the world to hedge a portfolio as big as 
Madoff’s.”98  Even more damning, Markopolos determined “Madoff had lost 
money in only three of the eighty-seven months between January 1993 and March 
2000, while the S&P 500 had been down in twenty-eight of those months. . . . That 
would be equivalent to a major league baseball player batting .996.”99  
The second person was Erin Arvedlund, of Barron’s Magazine.  In 2001, she 
wrote an article entitled “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Bernie Madoff Attracts Skeptics 
in 2011.”100  In the article, she mentioned Madoff’s fund seemed to always return a 
profit and unusually high interest.101  The article also pointed out the oddity of not 
charging management fees and Madoff’s unusual secrecy.102  Most condemning 
was this: “[T]hree option strategists for major investment banks told Barron’s they 
[could not] understand how Madoff churns out such numbers [using his 
strategy].”103  
                                                
94 HENRIQUES supra note 1, at 58.  When a Ponzi scheme goes bust, feeder fund customers typically 
have no claim against the estate because they were not “customers” of the debtor.  See generally Diana 
B. Henriques, Broader Pool of Madoff Victims to Benefit From Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2013, 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/18/compensation-fund-set-for-feeder-fund-victims-in-madoff-
scheme/?_r=0. 
95 HENRIQUES, supra note 1, at 58.  
96 Id. at 92.  Madoff kept the feeder funds quiet because he was not a registered investment advisor.  
Id.  “Behind closed doors . . . he was [] running an immensely large[] money management business, one 
that regulators knew nothing about.”  Id.  Madoff told those running the feeder funds to keep quiet about 
his name, thus avoiding scrutiny.  Id.  
97 MARKOPOLOS, supra note 79, at 36 (“[Markopolos’ bosses] began pushing [him] hard to reverse 
engineer Madoff’s strategy so Rampart could market a product that would deliver similar returns.”).  
98 HENRIQUES, supra note 1, at 123. 
99 Id. 
100 Erin E. Arvedlund, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Bernie Madoff Attracts Skeptics in 2001, BARRON’S 
(May 7, 2001), http://online.barrons.com/article/SB989019667829349012.html.  
101 Id. (“[Madoff’s] returns have been so consistent that some on the Street have begun speculating 
that Madoff’s market-making operation subsidizes and smooths his hedge-fund returns.”).  
102 Id.  “What Madoff told us was, ‘If you invest with me, you must never tell anyone that you’re 
invested with me.  It’s no one’s business what goes on here,’ says an investment manager who took over 
a pool of assets that included an investment in a Madoff fund.”  Id. 
103 Id. 
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In 2008, investors needed liquidity, so they called in their money, and 
Madoff’s inability to pay his liabilities became clear.104  In 2009, he pled guilty to 
securities fraud105 and was sentenced to 150 years in jail.106.  When he was 
exposed, the SIPC elected to manage the liquidation of BLIMS,107 and it appointed 
Irving Picard, the most experienced SIPA trustee in the nation, as trustee.108   
B. Picard and Liquidation  
Under SIPA, Madoff’s customers109 with approved claims received money or 
securities up to the statutory cap, and, if they claimed they were entitled to more, 
they had to wait for Picard to recover assets.110  Picard began by pursuing claw 
back suits, which collected a little over $9 billion.111  These actions recovered 
money from hundreds of individuals and organizations, including the financial 
institutions that would later be sued.112  However, customer claims exceeded $11 
billion.113  Statutes of limitations, legal defenses to claw back suits, difficulty 
                                                
104 MARKOPOLOS, supra note 79, at 201–02.  Madoff’s primary customers were the feeder funds 
and in 2008, “Madoff’s investors were desperate for cash to protect their investments and meet their 
growing client redemptions, and attempted to withdraw their money . . . more than $7 billion . . . [and] 
[t]here was no possible way Madoff could cover all these requests . . . .”  Id.  
105 In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. L.L.C., 721 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 2013) cert. denied, (134 S. 
Ct. 2895 (U.S. 2014) (“In March 2009, Madoff [pled] guilty to securities fraud and admitted that he had 
used his brokerage firm, Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (“BLMIS”), as a vast Ponzi 
scheme.”).  
106 Diana B. Henriques & Jack Healy, Madoff Goes to Jail After Guilty Pleas, N.Y. TIMES, Mar 12, 
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/13/business/13madoff.html?pagewanted=all.  For an interesting 
discussion of Ponzi scheme operator sentences, see Steven Rhodes, THE PONZI SCHEME BLOG, Guest 
Blog: Why I Voted That Ponzi Scheme Perps’ Sentences Are Too Long, (Jan. 3, 2014) 
http://www.theponzibook.blogspot.com/2014/01/guest-blog-why-i-voted-that-ponzi.html.  
107 S.I.P.C. Moves to Liquidate Madoff’s Firm, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2008, 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/12/15/sipc-moves-to-liquidate-madoffs-firm/?_r=0; Validity, 
Construction, and Application of Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 23 A.L.R. Fed. 157 (2014) 
(“Upon its determination that a broker-dealer is in danger of failing to meet its financial obligations, and 
that the customers of the broker-dealer are in need of the protection of [SIPA], the SIPC may petition a 
Federal District Court for the appointment of a trustee and the liquidation of the broker-dealer’s 
business.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see Annotation, Validity, Construction, and 
Application of Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 23 A.L.R. Fed. 157 (2014). 
108 Press Release, Securities Investor Protection Corporation, Liquidation Proceeding For Bernard 
L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC Undertaken By Securities Investor Protection Corporation, 
(Dec.15, 2008), available at http://www.madofftrustee.com/document/news/000061-121508-sipc-
madoff-filing-news-release-final.pdf. 
109 Kathy B. Phelps, Who Are the Victims in the Bernard Madoff Ponzi Scheme?, THE PONZI 
SCHEME BLOG (Nov. 24, 2013), http://www.theponzibook.blogspot.com/2013/11/who-are-victims-in-
bernard-madoff-ponzi.html.  
110 John Wasik, Is SIPC Doing Enough for Scam Victims?, FORBES (Sep. 20, 2012, 12:38 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnwasik/2012/09/20/is-sipc-doing-enough-for-scam-victims/.  
111 Building the Customer Fund, THE MADOFF RECOVERY INITIATIVE (Jan. 1, 2014) http://www. 
madofftrustee.com/document/other/blmisRecovery1_24_14.pdf.  
112 Recoveries to Date, THE MADOFF RECOVERY INITIATIVE, 
http://www.madofftrustee.com/recoveries-04.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). 
113 SIPA Liquidation Claims Process, THE MADOFF RECOVERY INITIATIVE, http://www. 
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tracking down all transfers, and legal fees limited full recovery.114  This being the 
case, Picard explored other avenues of recovery, so Picard v. JPMorgan115 began.  
C. The Case of Picard v. JPMorgan   
Picard sued JPMorgan, HSBC, UBS, and more than thirty other financial 
institutions,116 alleging they aided and abetted fraud, aided and abetted breach of 
fiduciary duty, were unjustly enriched by their relationship with BLMIS, and had 
committed fraud on the regulator.117  Under statutory and state law theories of 
contribution and tort, Picard sought $2 billion.118  Most of these firms had already 
                                                
madofftrustee.com/claims-03.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). 
114 Picard v. Katz, 462 B.R. 447, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), abrogated by Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. 
Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. L.L.C. (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (granting investor’s motion to dismiss on the 
ground the shorter statute of limitation applied, in part because “undoing such large transfers involving 
so many customers from so long ago as 2002 would . . . have a substantial and [] negative effect on the 
financial markets”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (internal citation omitted).  Under the Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), the statute of limitations is four years, and, under the Uniform 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act, the statute of limitations of the particular state governs, which ranges from 
three to six years.  TABB supra note 6, at 587.  
115 The citation to the consolidated case, which was heard by the Second Circuit and then appealed 
to the Supreme Court, is as follows: In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Secs. LLC., 721 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 
N.Y. 2013).  This is the consolidated case of two lower court cases: Picard v. HSBC Bank PLC, 454 
B.R. 25 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (Rakoff, J.) and Picard v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 460 B.R. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (McMahon, J.).  It should be noted, Picard sued many financial institutions in addition to HSBC 
and JPMorgan; they were just the primary defendants for the caption.  
116 In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Secs. LLC., 721 F.3d at 62 (2d Cir. 2013) (“On July 15, 2009, the 
Trustee commenced an adversary proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern 
District of New York against HSBC and thirty-six others, including UniCredit and Pioneer.”).  A few of 
the many other institutions were UniCredit, Pioneer Alternative Investment Management Ltd., UBS 
AG, et al., UniCredit Bank Austria AG., Access International Advisers, LLC, et al., Luxalpha Sicav, et 
al.  These firms were represented by counsel at the Second Circuit.  
117 Picard, 460 B.R. at 89–90 (“The Amended Complaint asserts common law damages claims for 
aiding and abetting fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, ‘fraud on the regulator,’ unjust enrichment, 
conversion, aiding and abetting conversion, knowing participation in a breach of trust, and contribution . 
. . The Trustee [also] alleges that the . . . Feeder Fund Defendants were aware that BMIS was likely 
engaged in fraud, but despite that knowledge sponsored two ‘feeder funds’ that invested heavily BMIS. 
UBS thereby lent the prestige of its name to the funds, and created the appearance of overseeing them.  
In reality, however, UBS delegated custodial and supervision functions to Madoff himself, ultimately 
helping Madoff attract additional European investors in BMIS, and willfully turning a blind eye in order 
to collect lucrative fees for servicing the funds.  The Access Defendants are alleged to have joined in 
this scheme by marketing the feeder funds to investors, despite knowing, or consciously avoiding 
knowing, that BMIS was a fraud, and misrepresenting to investors that Access performed rigorous due 
diligence.”); Floyd Norris, JPMorgan Lost Madoff in a Blizzard of Paper, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/10/business/madoffs-trail-lost-in-a-blizzard-of-paper.html; Diana B. 
Henriques, From Prison, Madoff Says Banks ‘Had to Know’ of Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/16/business/madoff-prison-interview.html?pagewanted=all. 
118 Judge Jacobs, in his Second Circuit decision, summed up the claims: “[T]he complaints allege 
that, when the Defendants were confronted with evidence of Madoff’s illegitimate scheme, their 
banking fees gave incentive to look away, or at least caused a failure to perform due diligence that 
would have revealed the fraud.”  In re Bernard L. Madoff, 721 F.3d at 57–58. 
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been party to fraudulent transfer suits.119 
BLMIS’s checking accounts resided with JPMorgan.120  All told, over about 
twenty years, JPMorgan made approximately $500 million from BLMIS in 
banking fees, investments, and interest.121  In 2006, twenty years into the 
relationship, Picard alleged JPMorgan’s “Chief Risk Officer John Hogan learned at 
a lunch . . . ‘there [was] a well-known cloud  over the head of Madoff and [] his 
returns [were] speculated to be part of a [P]onzi  scheme’ . . . [but after] a Google 
search on Madoff . . . [returned nothing] . . . no further  inquiries [were made]. . . 
.122  In 2008, Picard said “[t]hough JPMorgan [and other financial institutions like 
UBS and HSBC were] uniquely positioned to put an end to Madoff’s fraud, it . . . 
continued collecting its large fees.”123  UBS “reaped at least $80 million in fees as 
it facilitated investments in BLMIS. . . .”124  Picard left out the fact these 
companies lost money in the Madoff scheme as well.125  Though he brought some 
claims on behalf of BLMIS, what made his case unique was he brought many 
claims on behalf of defrauded customers.126   
The cases were filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court in the Southern 
District of New York.  The reference was withdrawn127 and sent to the United 
States District Court.128  The district courts dismissed on the grounds the trustee 
                                                
119 Clawing back many of the transfers was likely barred by the statute of limitations, which states, 
“The trustee [of a partnership debtor] may avoid any transfer . . . of an interest of the debtor in property, 
or any obligation . . . incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within 2 years before the 
date of the filing of the petition . . . .”  11 U.S.C. § 548 (a)(1)(1994). 
120 Picard, 460 B.R. at 89 (“Madoff maintained a bank account with JPMorgan, referred to as the 
‘703 Account,’ through which he funneled the money coming into and going out of BMIS over the life 
of his scheme.”). 
121 In re Bernard L. Madoff, 721 F.3d at 59 (“Madoff maintained a checking account at JPMorgan 
Chase & Co. (“JPMorgan”) for more than twenty years, beginning in 1986.  In the years prior to 
BLMIS’s bankruptcy, JPMorgan collected an estimated half billion dollars in fees, interest payments, 
and revenue from BLMIS.”).  
122 Id. at 60. 
123 Id. 
124 Id.  
125 Brief in Opposition for HSBC & Unicredit Respondents at 5, In Re Bernard L. Madoff, 721 F.3d 
54 (No. 13-448), 2013 WL 6665185, at *5 (“HSBC invested and lost nearly $1 billion of its own money 
in funds that, in turn, invested their assets with BLMIS, which evidences HSBC’s lack of knowledge of 
the fraud.”).  
126 Picard, 460 B.R. at 90 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[T]he Trustee seeks damages on behalf of BMIS’s 
customers, rather than BMIS itself.”). 
127 “Withdrawing the reference” is a jurisdictional matter of the bankruptcy court.  The basic idea is 
bankruptcy courts have limited jurisdiction and expertise, which is why bankruptcy matters are 
“referred” to them, so some cases are sent back to the district court for resolution when the issues do not 
concern bankruptcy.  See generally David I. Cisar & Christopher J. Schreiber, Withdrawing the 
Reference, and Its Strategic Application in Bankruptcy Litigation, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 79 (2009).  
128 In re Bernard L. Madoff, 721 F.3d at 62 (“On a motion by the UniCredit entities, the district 
court withdrew the reference to the bankruptcy court, for the limited purpose of deciding two threshold 
issues: (1) the Trustee’s standing to assert the common law claims, and (2) preemption of these claims 
by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act.”).  
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lacked standing to assert customer claims and the doctrine of in pari delicto129 
barred his BLMIS claims.130  Picard appealed to the Second Circuit.131   
IV. SECOND CIRCUIT OPINION 
Judge Dennis Jacobs, writing for a three-judge panel, affirmed the district 
court decisions.132  His opinion as to in pari delicto133 barring Picard’s claims—the 
contribution issue134—will not be covered because those conclusions applied to the 
                                                
129 See infra note 126.   
130 For a great summary of the reasoning in the district court, see SDNY District Court Holds that 
Madoff Trustee Lacks Standing to Assert Common Law Claims Against Third Parties on Behalf of 
Madoff Customers, MILBANK, TWEED, HADLEY & MCCLOY LLP (Aug. 9, 2011), 
http://www.milbank.com/images/content/5/9/5996/Picard-v-HSBC-FRG-LitigationClient-Alert-08-08-
2011.pdf.  
131 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, Picard v. JPMorgan, 11-5044-bk (2nd Cir. Feb. 16, 2012).  
132 In re Bernard L. Madoff, 721 F.3d at 77.  
133 In pari delicto, under New York common law, boils down to the fact “one wrongdoer may not 
recover against another.”  Id.; see also Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 15 N.Y.3d 446, 464 (2010) (noting the 
public policy behind in pari delicto: “First, denying judicial relief to an admitted wrongdoer deters 
illegality.  Second, in pari delicto avoids entangling courts in disputes between wrongdoers.  As Judge 
Desmond so eloquently put it more than 60 years ago, ‘no court should be required to serve as 
paymaster of the wages of crime, or referee between thieves.”) (internal citation omitted).  As the trustee 
of a debtor stands in the shoes of the debtor, not the shoes of creditors, Jacobs ruled the doctrine applied 
to bar Picard’s claims on behalf of BLMIS.  In re Bernard L. Madoff, 721 F.3d at 63 (“The debtor’s 
misconduct is imputed to the trustee because, innocent as he may be, he acts as the debtor’s 
representative.”) (citing Wight v. BankAmerica Corp., 219 F.3d 79, 87 (2d Cir.2000)).  Within the 
Second Circuit, this is treated as an issue of standing and is known within that circuit as the Wagoner 
rule: 
   
Under the Second Circuit’s Wagoner Rule, a trustee representing the bankrupt estate does 
not have standing to bring claims for harm to a corporation caused by the corporation’s 
illegal acts . . . The rationale underlying the Wagoner rule derives from the fundamental 
principle of agency that the misconduct of managers within the scope of their 
employment will normally be imputed to the corporation . . . . Because management’s 
misconduct is imputed to the corporation, and because a trustee stands in the shoes of the 
corporation, the Wagoner rule bars a trustee from suing to recover for a wrong that he 
himself essentially took part in.  
 
Amelia T. Rudolph, Tracy K. Ledbetter & Kurt Lentz, Invoking In Pari Delicto To Bar Accountant 
Liability Actions Brought By Trustees And Receivers, ST004 ALI-ABA 75, 128-29 (2011) (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Picard, in arguing for a reversal of the District Court’s 
decision on this issue, first asserted, though BLMIS was a wrongdoer, he was not a wrongdoer, so in 
pari delicto should not apply.  In re Bernard L. Madoff, 721 F.3d at 64.  Jacobs shot this down by citing 
Kirschner, in which the doctrine was applied to a trustee under identical facts.  Id.  Second, he argued an 
exception to in pari delicto, the “adverse interest” exception, “which directs a court not to impute to a 
corporation the bad acts of its agent when the fraud was committed for personal benefit” should apply to 
him.    Id.  Jacobs disagreed, noting the exception only applied to cases of theft or embezzlement 
against a corporation.  Id.  In this case, it would be impossible to separate Bernie Madoff from the firm 
bearing his own name.  Third, Picard argued the doctrine was not one of standing but should be decided 
on the merits.  However, Jacobs cited Wagoner, which did exactly that.  Id.    
134 Picard contended his claims of contribution for funds advanced by SIPA, brought under New 
York law, survived in pari delicto because parties seeking contribution are by definition in pari delicto.  
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BLMIS claims.  The focus here is on customer claims because their legal backdrop 
presents a more interesting topic of discussion.  
A. Standing 
The district courts said, because a trustee sits in the shoes of the debtor, 
Picard did not have standing to sue third parties on behalf of customers.135  Both 
sides agreed on what the general rule is, as to Article III standing: “To have 
standing, a plaintiff must (1) allege personal injury (2) fairly traceable to the 
defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct[,] and (3) likely to be redressed by the 
requested relief.”136  Additionally, the parties agreed as to the key prudential 
standing requirement: “A party must assert his own legal rights and interests.”137  
Jacobs began his opinion by noting the Supreme Court’s decision in Caplin 
v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. of New York138 controlled.139  In Caplin, the 
trustee of a corporate debtor brought suit against a trustee of outstanding debt, on 
behalf of the debt holders.140  The Supreme Court ruled the corporate trustee, under 
the bankruptcy rules,141 did not have standing to bring suit on behalf of 
customers.142  The Court also made a valuable observation:  
It is difficult to see precisely why . . . the trustee in reorganization 
should represent the  interests of the debenture holders, who are capable 
of deciding for themselves whether or  not it is worthwhile to seek to 
                                                
In re Bernard L. Madoff, 721 F.3d at 65 (“The New York statute provides that ‘two or more persons 
who are subject to liability for damages for the same personal injury, injury to property or wrongful 
death, may claim contribution among them whether or not an action has been brought or a judgment has 
been rendered against the person from whom contribution is sought.’”).  Though Jacobs noted this was 
Picard’s strongest argument under in pari delicto, it still failed because the New York statute required 
the party seeking compulsion to have been required to make a payment, under state law, to then seek 
contribution.  Here, there was no state law mandate to pay monies, only a federal mandate.  In Jacob’s 
opinion, the federal possibility of contribution was not sufficient to establish a state claim for 
contribution.  Id. at 65–66 (“The source of a right of contribution under state law must be an obligation 
imposed by state law.”) (quoting LNC Invs., Inc. v. First Fid. Bank, 935 F.Supp. 1333, 1349 
(S.D.N.Y.1996)). 
135 Picard, 460 B.R. at 91 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[T]he Trustee lacks standing under the Bankruptcy 
Code, as incorporated into SIPA, to pursue claims that properly belong to creditors.”); Picard v. HSBC 
Bank PLC, 454 B.R. 25, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[E]ven though a bankruptcy trustee can seek to recover 
monies on behalf of the debtor’s estate that will ultimately be used to help satisfy creditors’ claims, it is 
settled law that the federal Bankruptcy Code (Title 11, United States Code) does not itself confer 
standing on a bankruptcy trustee to assert claims against third parties on behalf of the estate’s creditors 
themselves, because the trustee stands in the shoes of the debtor, not the creditors.”).  
136 In re Bernard L. Madoff, 721 F.3d at 66 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).  
137 Id. at 58 (internal quotes omitted) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)).   
138 406 U.S. 416 (1972). 
139 In re Bernard L. Madoff, 721 F.3d at 58. 
140 406 U.S. at 416–21.  
141 The trustee sued under “Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 883.”  Id. at 416.  
142 Id. at 434 (“[W]e conclude that petitioner does not have standing to sue an indenture trustee on 
behalf of debenture holders.”).  
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recoup whatever losses they may have suffered by an  action against the 
[third-party] indenture trustee.  [Furthermore] [a]ny suit by debenture 
holders would not affect the interests of other parties to the 
reorganization[, so i]t  would seem, therefore, that the debenture 
holders, the persons truly affected by the suit . .  . should make their 
own assessment of the respective advantages and disadvantages, not 
only of litigation, but of various theories of litigation.143 
Picard’s first major standing argument was, though Caplin controlled, narrow 
exceptions existed, under Redington v. Touche Ross & Co.144 and St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co. v. PepsiCo, Inc.145—both Second Circuit decisions.146  In 
Redington, a liquidating trustee sued the former accountant of the debtor broker-
dealer for, among other things, violations of securities laws.147  The district court 
dismissed the case, holding no private cause of action existed to enforce Section 17 
of the Securities Act148 and the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the 
common law claims.149  The Second Circuit reversed, holding a private cause of 
action does exist when brought by customers.150  The Redington court also held the 
trustee was the proper party to bring these suits because the SIPC was subrogated 
to the claims of customers, even claims against third parties.151   
Judge Jacobs acknowledged the Second Circuit’s disposition in Redington 
favored Picard but held Redington was no longer good law.152  He pointed out the 
Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s decision in Redington on a threshold 
issue, and, on remand, the Second Circuit could not find a basis for standing.153  As 
such, “[t]he Supreme Court’s reversal on the threshold question drained the Second 
Circuit Redington opinion of force on other questions.”154  Jacobs then noted any 
“half-life” Redington might have within the circuit155 should be finally quashed 
                                                
143 Id. at 431.  
144 592 F.2d 617, 619 (2d Cir. 1978) rev’d, 442 U.S. 560 (1979). 
145 884 F.2d 688, 691 (2d Cir. 1989). 
146 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16–21, Picard v. JPMorgan Chase & Co. (In re Bernard L. 
Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC), 721 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 13-448), 2013 WL 5555099, at *16–21.  
147 This note will be clear to say if the interpretation of a case is one held by Picard, the defendants, 
or Judge Jacobs.  Absent such qualification, the summary of cases are that of the Author.  
148 Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., 428 F. Supp. 483, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (“There is nothing 
explicit to show any legislative intent respecting a private claim under Section 17 [of the securities 
act].”).  
149 Id. at 493 (“[T]he Trustee is a citizen of New York and is a plaintiff along with SIPC. Partners of 
Touche, the defendant, are citizens of New York. Thus, there is no complete diversity of citizenship . . . 
.”).  
150 Redington, 592 F.2d at 623–24 (“[W]e decide that brokers’ customers have a right of action 
against accountants for certifications that violate the standard set by section 17 . . . .”).  
151 Id. at 624 (“[W]e find that SIPC is subrogated to the right of action implied in section 17 in favor 
of brokers’ customers against third parties such as accountants.”). 
152 In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC., 721 F.3d 54, 68 (2d Cir. 2013). 
153 Id. 
154 Id.  
155 This was Picard’s argument.  
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because “[f]ollowing the Supreme Court’s reversal, this Court vacated its original 
judgment [in Redington] on the ground that subject matter jurisdiction was 
lacking.”156  Jacobs was clear: “Redington should be put to rest; it has no 
precedential effect.”157  
Even if Redington was good law, Jacobs noted, first, the case was about a 
private right of action under a regulatory law, not about mass tort actions against 
third parties.158  Second, Redington dealt with real parties in interest under FRCP 
17(a) and, thus, was inapplicable in the current case.159  Third, he pointed out 
Redington involved a single act by a single party, not analogous to the facts alleged 
by Picard.160  Fourth and finally, Jacobs stressed Redington was about the actions 
of malfeasant managers who acted independent of company direction; the facts of 
Redington were not analogous to the case at hand, where Madoff used BLMIS as 
his personal fraud vehicle and piggy bank.161  
Jacobs then turned to St. Paul Fire, a case Picard cited for the proposition a 
trustee may bring claims on behalf of creditors who are generalized in nature,162 as 
property of the estate.163  St. Paul concerned, among other issues, claims brought 
by the trustee of the debtor corporation, on behalf of the debtor and unsecured 
creditors, against a third party.164  That third party, at one point, had owned the 
parent company of the debtor.165  In assessing whether the trustee had standing, the 
St. Paul court ruled “[i]f a claim is a general one, with no particularized injury 
arising from it, and if that claim could be brought by any creditor of the debtor, 
[against an alter ego entity related to the debtor,] the trustee is the proper person to 
assert the claim.”166 
Jacobs saw St. Paul as distinguishable from Picard. 167  First, St. Paul was 
about whom the proper party was to bring a claim possessed by both the debtor and 
                                                
156 In re Bernard L. Madoff, 721 F.3d at 68.  
157 Id. at 69.  
158 Id. (“Redington considered chiefly whether the trustee and SIPC had standing to bring a cause of 
action under Section 17 of the Exchange Act; the opinion said nothing about a SIPA trustee’s ability to 
orchestrate mass tort actions against third parties.”).  
159 Id. (“Second, our holding in Redington turned, in part, on an analysis of Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(a), 
which sets forth rules concerning real parties in interest, and which has no application here.”).  
160 Id. (“Redington involved claims against a single accounting firm for a few discrete instances of 
alleged misconduct.”).  
161 Id. at 69.  
162 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 884 F.2d 688, 701 (2d Cir. 1989).  “If a claim is 
a general one, with no particularized injury arising from it, and if that claim could be brought by any 
creditor of the debtor, the trustee is the proper person to assert the claim . . . .”  Id. 
163 Id. at 700.  (“[I]f a cause of action is property of the debtor, the Bankruptcy Code explicitly gives 
the trustee the right to assert it on behalf of the estate.”). 
164 Id. at 690–92.   
165 Id. at 701. (“[H]ere it is Banner, the alleged alter ego, rather than the bankruptcy trustee that is 
contesting PepsiCo’s assertions, and that the bankruptcy trustee has apparently not moved to stay these 
proceedings or to intervene in this case.”).  
166 Id.  
167 In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC., 721 F.3d 54, 70 (2d Cir. 2013).  
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creditors.168 In the Picard case, creditors alone held the claims.169  Second, to read 
St. Paul as conferring standing on trustees to sue third parties would conflict with 
Second Circuit law.170  Third, Jacobs noted Picard’s claims, on behalf of customers 
were in no sense of the word “general,” rather the “claims [in the case were 
brought] on behalf of thousands of customers against third-party financial 
institutions for their handling of individual investments made on various dates in 
varying amounts.”171  In sum, the Second Circuit held the law of the circuit did not 
provide exceptions to the rule under Caplin—a trustee does not have standing to 
assert claims on behalf of creditors. 172   
Picard’s second major standing argument was SIPA conferred standing upon 
a trustee by creating a bailment relationship between the trustee and customers.173  
He asserted the same was true under common law.174  To this SIPA-bailment 
argument, Jacobs said a SIPA trustee is generally limited to the powers of a 
bankruptcy trustee, and a bankruptcy trustee is not allowed to bring claims on 
behalf of creditors.175  Jacobs noted, though a SIPA trustee does possess additional 
powers, “[n]owhere does [SIPA] reference bailment, or characterize customers as 
‘bailors’ or trustees as ‘bailees,’ or in any way indicate that the trustee is acting as 
bailee of customer property.”176  The Second Circuit rejected the SIPA-bailment 
argument. 177   
As to common law bailment, Jacobs noted a bailment relationship is 
established when one party places property into the hands of another.178  During 
that time, the party entrusted with property has certain rights as to that property.179  
In the Picard case, customers gave property to BLMIS, and the minute Picard took 
                                                
168 Id.  
169 Id.  
170 Id. (“The Trustee’s broad reading of St. Paul would bring the Court’s holding into conflict with a 
line of cases that came before and after it.”).  
171 Id.  
172 Id.  
173 Brief for Trustee-Appellant Irving H. Picard, As Trustee for the Substantively Consolidated Sipa 
Liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC & Bernard L. Madoff, at 26–27, In re 
Bernard Madoff Inv. Secs. LLC., 721 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 2013) (11-5175-bk)  2012 WL 626191 at *20. 
(“As a bailee, a SIPA trustee has the right to sue any wrongdoer whom [the customers] could sue 
themselves.  Under the law of bailment, a bailee can vindicate harm to the bailed property based on his 
possessory interest.”)  (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
174 Id.  
175 In re Bernard L. Madoff, 721 F.3d at 71.  “As a general rule, SIPA vests trustees with ‘the same 
powers and title with respect to the debtor and the property of the debtor . . . as a trustee in a case under 
Title 11.’”  Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-3(a)(1) (2010)). 
176 Id. at 72. 
177 Id. 
178 Id.  “A bailment is ‘a delivery of personalty for some particular purpose, or on mere deposit, 
upon a contract express or implied, that after the purpose has been fulfilled it will be redelivered to the 
person who delivered it, or otherwise dealt with according to that person’s directions, or kept until it is 
reclaimed.’”  Id. (citing 9 N.Y. Jur. 2d Bailments and Chattel Leases § 1 (West 2013)).  
179 See generally 8 C.J.S. Bailments § 4 (2014).  
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control of BLMIS as trustee, the property became impaired in bankruptcy.180  In 
other words, no bailment existed because “any supposed bailment pre-dated 
Picard’s appointment.”181  Additionally, Jacobs noted Picard’s obligation was to 
return property to the debtor, not customers, so bailment did not exist.182  Finally, 
in response to the claim BLMIS was the bailee and Picard represented BLMIS, 
Jacobs replied: a “thief is not a bailee of stolen property.”183  In sum, the Second 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s standing decision.  
B. Subrogation 
Picard next argued the subrogation provisions in SIPA provided a trustee 
with standing to sue third parties.184  According to Picard, when the SIPC advances 
funds to customers, it becomes subrogated to the entirety of their claims—those 
that even remotely relate to the debtor.185  Picard’s argument stemmed from 15 
U.S.C. § 78fff-3, which states in relevant part:  
To the extent moneys are advanced by SIPC to the trustee to pay or 
otherwise satisfy the  claims of customers, in addition to all other rights 
it  may have at law or in equity, SIPC  shall be subrogated to the claims 
of such customers . . . except that SIPC as subrogee may  assert no 
claim against customer property until after the allocation thereof to 
customers  as provided in section 78fff-2(c) of this title.186 
Picard argued his suit fell under SIPC’s subrogation rights “at law or in 
equity.”187  
Jacobs’s began his discussion of the subrogation issue by asserting Picard’s 
view of the statute was wrong: 
                                                
180 Id. 
181 In re Bernard L. Madoff, 721 F.3d at 72. 
182 Id. at 72–73 (“Picard’s claims are intended to augment the general fund of customer property so 
that it can be distributed ratably based on customers’ net equity.  This arrangement is not an analog to a 
bailment, in which the bailee is entrusted with an item that is to be recovered by the bailor at some later 
time.”).  
183 Id. at 73.  
184 Id. at 58.  Though this section on subrogation could technically go under the topic of standing, it 
is more appropriate as its own heading because the basis of the argument was subrogation, which would 
have the effect of conferring standing.  
185 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 23, In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Secs. LLC., (2013) (No. 13-
448), 2013 WL 5555099, at *23.  Picard’s argument is best summed by this comment: “SIPC became 
subrogated to customers’ claims against Madoff’s enablers and abettors when it provided advances for 
losses that they helped to bring about. Accordingly, the Trustee, to whom SIPC assigned its claims, is 
entitled to step into the shoes of BLMIS’s customers and attempt to recover the funds that it advanced to 
compensate for others’ malfeasance.”  Id.  
186 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-3 (2010). 
187 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 23, In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Secs. LLC., (2013) (No. 13-
448), 2013 WL 5555099, at *23. 
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It is undisputed that the phrase “claims of customers” refers (as 
throughout the statute)  to customers’ net equity claims against the 
estate.188  SIPA thus allows only a narrow  right of subrogation—for 
SIPC to assert claims against the fund of customer property and 
 thereby recoup any funds advanced to customers once the SIPA 
trustee has satisfied  those customers’ net equity claims.189   
In other words, after SIPA gives defrauded customers their money, SIPA has 
a right to collect that money from the estate, not from third parties.  Jacobs also 
noted there is no indication, when Congress added the language “in addition to all 
other rights it may have at law or in equity” in 1978, it intended to expand the 
powers of the trustee—there was “no sign that Congress intended an expansive 
increment of power to SIPA trustees.”190  Additionally, he noted the Chairman of 
the SIPC at the time commented, “claims of SIPC as subrogee (except as otherwise 
provided), should be allowable only as claims against the general estate.”191   
Strengthening his argument, Jacobs also pointed out Caplin was decided 
before the revision of SIPA in 1978. 192  Caplin held a trustee did not have standing 
to sue on behalf of customers, so if Congress had intended in 1978 to overturn the 
Supreme Court with the above language, it would have made this intention clear.193  
Furthermore, the Court in Caplin was not shy to say Congress could establish 
trustee standing to sue third parties.194  Jacobs noted legislation cannot be read as if 
Congress intended to hide an elephant in a mouse hole.195  Driving a nail into the 
coffin of Picard’s argument, Jacobs finally noted the SIPC suggested the “at law or 
equity” language to Congress, and even explained the purpose was to “make clear 
that SIPC’s subrogation rights under the 1970 Act are cumulative with whatever 
                                                
188 In re Bernard Madoff Inv. Secs. LLC., 721 F.3d 54, 74 (2d Cir. 2013) (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted).   
189 Id.  
190 Id. 
191 Id. (citing Report to the Board of Directors of SIPC of the Special Task Force to Consider 
Possible Amendments to SIPA 12 (July 31, 1974) Letter of Transmittal, Recommendation II.A.9); see 
also SIPA Amendments of 1975: Hearings on H.R. 8064 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection 
and Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. 64 (1976) [hereinafter 
Hearings on H.R. 8064]. 
192 Id. 
193 In re Bernard L. Madoff, 721 F.3d at 75 (“If Congress sought to exempt SIPA trustees from 
Caplin’s rule and expand SIPC’s subrogation rights to tort actions against third parties, we would expect 
such intent to be manifested in the statutory wording and in the record.”).  
194 Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416, 434 (1972). (“[W]e conclude that 
petitioner does not have standing to sue an indenture trustee on behalf of debenture holders.  This does 
not mean that it would be unwise to confer such standing on trustees in reorganization.  It simply 
signifies that Congress has not yet indicated even a scintilla of an intention to do so.”). 
195 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (“Congress, we have held, does not 
alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions[—]it does 
not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”); Rebecca M. Kysar, Statutory Interpretation: How 
Much Work Does Language Do?: Penalty Default Interpretive Canons, 76 BROOKLYN L. REV. 953, 963 
(2011) (“[I]f a statutory interpretation would significantly change the existing legal landscape, a lack of 
congressional debate on the issue is evidence that Congress did not intend that interpretation.”).  
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rights it may have under other State or Federal laws.”196  Therefore, the language 
was not intended to create new causes of action, as Picard asserted.197   
C. Insurance Law 
Picard also argued, in the insurance law context, insurers can sue third parties 
on behalf of the insured customer.198  As the SIPC functions as an insurer, he 
argued the same principles should apply.199  Jacobs acknowledged the appeal of 
this argument but held courts should “avoid engrafting common law principles 
onto a statutory scheme unless Congress’s intent is manifest.”200  This conclusion 
was supported by the fact the SIPC fund is not insurance.201 
D. Equity and Public Policy 
In the vein of equity and customer-centric public policy, Picard argued, 
“unless he [could] spearhead the litigation on behalf of defrauded customers, the 
victims [would] not be made whole, SIPC [would] be unable to recoup its 
advances, and third-party tortfeasors [would] reap windfalls.”202  In addition, he 
asserted it was inequitable to allow financial institutions to keep the money they 
made from Madoff at the expense of innocent investors who essentially supplied 
that money.203  While again acknowledging the appeal of Picard’s argument, 
Jacobs held “equity has its limits; it may fill certain gaps in a statute, but it should 
not be used to enlarge substantive rights and powers.”204  Jacobs also noted many 
practical hurdles and unanswered questions stood in the way of granting a trustee 
the power to sue third parties on behalf of customers:205  Would such suits prevent 
                                                
196 In re Bernard L. Madoff, 721 F.3d at 75.  
197 Id. (“There is no sign that Congress intended an expansive increment of power to SIPA 
trustees.”).  
198 6af-174f Appleman on Insurance § 4051 (2014). 
199 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 23, In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Secs. LLC., (2013) (No. 13-
448), 2013 WL 5555099, at *23. 
200 In re Bernard L. Madoff, 721 F.3d at 76.  
201 Id.  “While this Court has referred to SIPC as providing a form of public insurance, it is clear 
that the obligations imposed on an insurance provider under state law do not apply to this 
congressionally-created nonprofit membership corporation.”  Id.  (citing In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. 
Sec. LLC, 654 F. 3d 229, 239 (2d Cir. 2011)).  In addition, Jacobs commented; “The clearest 
Congressional intent here is that we should treat SIPA as a bankruptcy statute, not as an insurance 
scheme.”  Id. 
202 Id. 
203 Brief for Trustee-Appellant Irving H. Picard, As Trustee for the Substantively Consolidated Sipa 
Liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC & Bernard L. Madoff at 11, In re Bernard 
L. Madoff, 721 F.3d 54 (No. 11-5044), 2012 WL 626186 at *11 (“By virtue of its relationship with 
Madoff, JPMC reaped rewards in the hundreds of millions of dollars, leaving the customers to suffer the 
devastating consequences.”).  “[W]hen the collapse of Madoff’s scheme became imminent, JPMC 
silently liquidated its position, leaving its clients and BLMIS’s customers holding the bag.”  Id. at 6.  
204 In re Bernard L. Madoff, 721 F.3d at 76.  
205 Id. at 77 (“Would such suits prevent customers from ‘mak[ing] their own assessment of the 
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customers from bringing their own; would customers have input on strategy and 
settlement; who would be bound by judgments; and how would inconsistent 
judgments be handled?206  The Second Circuit, like the Supreme Court in Caplin, 
thought these issues should be left to Congress.207  In sum, “Picard’s scattershot 
responses [to the district court] are resourceful, but they all miss[ed] the mark.”208  
V. ANALYSIS OF PICARD’S WRIT 
Picard appealed to the United States Supreme Court.209  In his briefs, he 
made a number of arguments for why the Court should hear the case and for why 
the Second Circuit should be overturned.210  Picard’s appeal can be boiled down to 
three arguments.211  First, a circuit split exists on the issue of the standing of a 
SIPA trustee, under subrogation, to sue on behalf of creditors.212  Second, a circuit 
split exists on the issue of state and federal contribution law.213  Third, there is a 
                                                
respective advantages and disadvantages, not only of litigation, but of various theories of litigation’?  
Can a SIPA trustee control customers’ claims against third parties if SIPC has not fully satisfied the 
customers’ claims against the estate?  How would inconsistent judgments be avoided, given that 
‘independent actions are still likely because it is extremely doubtful that [the parties] would agree on the 
amount of damages to seek, or even on the theory on which to sue’?  Who would be bound by a 
settlement entered into by either the Trustee or by each customer who brings suit?”) (alteration in 
original) (citations omitted) (quoting Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416, 431–32  
(1972) (citing Caplin)). 
206 Id. 
207 Id. (“[I]t is better to leave these intractable policy judgments to Congress.”). 
208 Id. at 64.  
209 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 146, at 1.  In a bankruptcy proceeding, the trustee does 
not typically represent herself in court but hires counsel to do so.  This case is no exception and the writ 
was filed by Picard’s attorneys at BakerHostetler, LLP.  Id. at i.  This is why the writ refers to “the 
Trustee” in the third person.  Id. 
210 Reply Brief of Petitioner, In re Bernard L. Madoff, 721 F.3d 54 (No. 13-448), 2013 WL 
6729877; Petitioner’s Supplemental Brief in Response to the Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae, In re Bernard L. Madoff, 721 F.3d 54 (No. 13-448), 2014 WL 2506623.  This note will not be 
able to cover each and every argument made by Picard and the defendants in their multiple briefs 
submitted to the court.  This note will focus on the arguments asserted by Picard that appear to be of the 
highest merit, as well as the counter-arguments with the most merit.  See infra Part V.A–C. 
211 Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 210. 
212 Id. at 2. 
213 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 146, at 6.  As this topic will not be covered, a brief 
summary of the arguments is appropriate.  Picard asserted he had a valid contribution claim because 
federal law did not preempt his state law claims.  Id.  Additionally, he made the argument the Second 
Circuit erred by not undertaking that analysis.  Id. at 9.  Picard cited two cases for the proposition other 
circuits apply a preemption analysis in this context: Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 876 
F.2d 1101 (4th Cir. 1989), and Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. IADA Services, 497 F.3d 
862 (8th Cir. 2007).  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 146, at 6–7.  Defendants responded with 
four strong arguments.  Supplemental Brief for Respondents, In re Bernard L. Madoff, 721 F.3d 54 (No. 
13-448), 2014 WL 2621859.  First, the issue of preemption was not raised below, and so should not be 
heard by the Court.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9–10, In re Bernard L. Madoff, 721 
F.3d 54 (No. 13-448), 2014 WL 2191242, at *9–10.  They pointed out the Supreme Court is “a court of 
review, not of first view,” so the issue is inappropriate.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, 
supra, at 10.  Also, the court in Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union of America, 451 U.S. 77 
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circuit split as to a trustee’s standing under the Bankruptcy Code to bring claims on 
behalf of creditors.214  The contribution argument applied to claims brought on 
behalf of BLMIS, so it will not be considered here.215  Picard’s writ asserted the 
Second Circuit interpreted the law too narrowly, and, thus, was on the losing side 
of each issue.216  He also argued the Second Circuit’s decision adversely impacted 
investors and hindered SIPC’s ability to do its job.217  Also, his writ asserted the 
scale of Madoff’s fraud made the case worthy of review,218 and the Madoff case 
has long-term implications on SIPA and the SIPC.219  His writ is long on creativity, 
customer-centric public policy, and equity but short on the law.  Additionally, 
Picard does not contemplate the costly impacts his interpretation of the law would 
have on the financial services industry—a cost that would no doubt trickle down to 
investors.  The Court has yet to decide whether to hear the case.220 
A. Subrogation 
1. Picard’s Circuit Split Argument  
As in the Second Circuit, Picard argued, when SIPC advanced more than 
                                                
(1981), was clear that “a right to contribution under state law [exists] in cases in which state law 
supplied the appropriate rule of decision.”  Id. at 12–13.  Here, the case arose under federal law, SIPA, 
so the rules of the state do not apply.  Id. at 9.  Second, even if federal law did not bar the state law 
claim, the New York doctrine of in pari delicto does.  Id.  Third, there is no conflict between the circuits 
on this issue, so hearing the issue is not worth the court’s time.  Id.  Fourth and finally, there is no 
reoccurring importance in regards to this narrow issue.  Id.   
214 Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 210, at 10. 
215 Id. at 9.  This is not to say there are not great implications of a trustee’s ability to sue third 
parties on behalf of the debtor; however, the more interesting issue concerns standing to sue on behalf 
of customers.  
216 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 146, at 3. 
217 Id. 
218 Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 210, at 1 (“Few petitions raise issues so weighty as those 
here.  Supported by a cadre of leading financial institutions, Bernard Madoff defrauded his customers of 
nearly $20 billion.  While those institutions reaped profits for aiding Madoff’s fraud, his customers 
suffered incalculable injuries beyond those to their finances and livelihoods.  This case is an essential 
part of the Trustee’s effort to recover what was lost.  It would be worthy of consideration on that basis 
alone.”).  
219 Id.  (“Respondents’ view of the law, which prevailed below, will permanently hobble SIPC and 
SIPA trustees from carrying out their duty to make whole the customers of failed brokerages.”).  
220 That is as of this writing, in February of 2014.  The process for the Solicitor General to provide 
an opinion is:  
 
[B]oth sides will . . . meet with the solicitor general in an attempt to receive his office’s 
support. The SG . . . has complete discretion to recommend [that] the cert petition be 
granted or denied, to submit a brief that takes no position on cert, or to decline altogether 
the court’s invitation to submit a brief. 
 
Alison Frankel, Why Does SCOTUS Want SG View on Madoff Trustee Suits vs Bank Enablers?, 
REUTERS (Jan. 15, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2014/01/15/why-does-scotus-want-sg-
view-on-madoff-trustee-suits-vs-bank-enablers/.  
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$800 million to customers of BLIMS, it became subrogated to the entirety of their 
claims.221  He began by noting two cases purportedly conflict with the Second 
Circuit’s decision: Appleton v. First National Bank of Ohio222 and Securities and 
Exchange Commission v. Albert & Maguire Securities Co.223   
Appleton involved a SIPA trustee who sued third party banks to recover 
funds that had been wrongfully accepted by them.224  The district court dismissed 
for lack of standing, but the Sixth Circuit reversed, noting, “based on Redington 
[from the Second Circuit] and the 1978 amendment to § 78fff–3(a) . . . a right of 
subrogation exists on behalf of customers whose claims have been paid by the 
SIPC against third parties.”225  This argument—the language of 78fff-3(a) confers 
standing—is arguably Picard’s strongest.226 
As the defendants point out, Picard is wrong on Appleton because that case 
was not well-reasoned or correctly decided.227  Not only did the court in Appleton 
not cite the legislative history of the 1978 SIPA amendments,228 but it also relied 
almost exclusively on a mistaken reading of Redington and failed to recognize the 
Second Circuit had vacated Redington.229  Furthermore, the fact the Second Circuit 
in the Picard case confirmed Redington has no value also drained the Appleton 
decision of authority.230  Finally, even assuming Appleton was good law, it is not 
analogous.231  Appleton involved a situation akin to a fraudulent transfer, and a 
                                                
221 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 146, at 19 (“When SIPC provided more than $800 
million for advances to BLMIS customers, it obtained a right of subrogation to their claims by operation 
of statute and equity.  15 U.S.C. § 78fff-3(a).  The Second Circuit’s decision disregards that right, 
compromising the SIPA regime, while allowing parties that profited from the looting of investors’ 
assets to pass the buck to SIPC and SIPA trustees.”).   
222 62 F.3d 791 (6th Cir. 1995).  
223 560 F.2d 569 (3d Cir.1977). 
224 Appleton, 62 F.3d at 795 (“[The bank] deposited a total of 165 checks . . . with a combined face 
value of approximately $3.1 million . . . . Some of the checks so deposited bore no indorsement.”).   
225 Id. at 800.  
226 Adam Agatston, Drawing the Line for Ponzi Scheme Victims, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. (Nov. 4, 
2013, 11:27 PM), http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12900.  
227 Brief in Opposition for HSBC & Unicredit Respondents, supra note 125, at 10–12. 
228 Id.  This is not to say legislative history is required.  See generally Kenneth R. Dortzbach, 
Legislative History: The Philosophies of Justices Scalia and Breyer and the Use of Legislative History 
by the Wisconsin State Courts, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 161 (1996). 
229 Brief in Opposition for HSBC & Unicredit Respondents, supra note 125, at 11. 
230 Id. at 10 (“Any tension between the Second Circuit’s decision below and Appleton . . . stems 
from Appleton’s erroneous view of the law in the Second Circuit.  Appleton’s misconception of Second 
Circuit law has been [put] to rest by the decision below.”).  
231 Id. at 12 (“[T]he trustee’s claims in Appleton sought only recovery of the specific amounts of the 
wrongfully deposited checks at issue, not recovery of unparticularized damages for purported third-
party torts.  Moreover, those claims were expressly limited to the amounts of the SIPA advances the 
customers had received: [e]ach of the checks was the subject of a claim in the liquidation, and each was 
satisfied within the limits of [SIPA]’s protection.  Here, by contrast, petitioner seeks to initiate class-
action lawsuits and assert any number of tort claims against third parties on customers’ behalf,[—]a 
project entirely unmoored from SIPA’s language and purpose[—]and claims a right to recover billions 
of dollars in damages that dwarf the total amount of SIPA advances actually paid to customers of 
BLMIS.  Appleton recognized no such right of action.”) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) 
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direct connection existed between the funds on deposit at the bank and 
customers.232  
As to the Third Circuit’s decision in Albert & Maguire, that case involved 
monetary claims assigned by a defrauded customer to a bank and concerned what 
priority that bank should have in liquidation.233  Picard cited the following 
language: “[T]he trustee and SIPC stand not in the shoes of the debtor . . . but, 
rather, in those of the customer.”234  The problem with Picard’s assertion is this 
quote is dicta.235  The key language, which precedes the quote, states “[i]f the 
bankruptcy court believed that too much delay would be involved . . . it might have 
allowed the trustee to purchase securities” and then exercise claims.236  The key 
language here is “might,” and confirms the fact the court in Albert & Maguire was 
entertaining a hypothetical.  This language, from a 1977 case,237 has no 
precedential value.238  Additionally, even if Albert & Maguire had precedential 
value, that case dealt with an assignment.239  In sum, as the defendants point out, 
the only conflict that existed as to this issue was within the Second Circuit, 
concerning Redington, and that conflict has been resolved.240   
Picard then argued the language of SIPA, specifically the “at law or in 
equity” section, was added by Congress to create a cause of action for trustees to 
assert on behalf of customers.241  His logic was Congress legislates within the 
context of common law, such as insurance law, so Congress incorporated common 
law into the statute.242  There are many problems with his argument.  First, as the 
defendants point out, without explicit language, statutes should not be read to alter 
fundamental regulatory schemes.243  The defendants quoted the Supreme Court: 
                                                
(internal quotation marks omitted).   
232 Id.  
233 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Albert & Maguire Sec. Co., 560 F.2d 569, 570 (3d Cir. 1977) (“A 
bank receiving an assignment of a customer’s claim in a Securities Investor Protection Act liquidation 
may not be entitled to assume that preferred status when the equities are contraindicative.  After a 
review of the circumstances in this, a case of first impression, we conclude that the district court did not 
err in relegating the Bank’s claim to that of a general creditor . . . .”). 
234 Id. at 574. 
235 Brief in Opposition for HSBC & Unicredit Respondents, supra note 125, at 13.   
236 Albert & Maguire, 560 F.2d at 573 (emphasis added).  
237 Brief in Opposition for HSBC & Unicredit Respondents, supra note 125, at 14.  
238 Id.  It should be noted “[s]tare decisis does not attach to such parts of the opinion of a court as 
are mere dicta.”  BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010).  
239 No assignment existed in the Picard case.  
240 Brief in Opposition for HSBC & Unicredit Respondents, supra note 125, at 20 (“[T]he Second 
Circuit’s comprehensive decision merely resolved a lingering dispute within its jurisdiction.”).  
241 Petition for Writ of Certiorari,  supra note 146, at 23 (“[A]s several courts of appeals recognized 
in the 1970s, SIPC is a classic subrogee under common law.  And Congress ratified that view when it 
amended SIPA to expressly provide a statutory sub-rogation right while specifically preserving “all 
other rights [SIPC] may have at law or in equity.”) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-3(a) (2012); see H.R. 8331, 
95th Cong. (1978)) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
242 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 146, at 22–23. 
243 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). 
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“Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in 
vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in 
mouseholes.”244  Second, not only is there an absence of legislative history 
indicating the language was added for the purpose Picard indicates, but there is 
legislative history showing the language was added to ensure SIPC had the right to 
bring suits against those who had injured the SIPC, not customers.245 
Picard’s final subrogation argument was the importance of the Madoff case 
meant the Court should hear it.246  He asserted, by not allowing SIPC to recoup all 
of its funds, the Second Circuit had prohibited it from doing its job.247  The 
problem here is Congress never envisioned the SIPC would be fully reimbursed for 
its outlays in each case.248  Furthermore, the SIPC has many ways to increase funds 
without pursuing litigation.249  Additionally, the fact the Second Circuit ruled the 
trustee cannot pursue third parties does not mean SIPC’s subrogation rights to 
collect money it fronts to customers is in any way limited; the Second Circuit’s 
decision does not prevent the SIPC from doing its job.250  
2. Subrogation Public Policy 
Picard then asserted allowing the Second Circuit’s decision to stand would 
mean financial institutions would not be held accountable for their actions and 
would even be incentivized to engage in questionable activities.251  This was a 
weak and speculative argument.  Financial firms take their reputation in the 
marketplace seriously; not being pursued by trustees in these types of cases will not 
                                                
244 Id.; see Brief in Opposition for HSBC & Unicredit Respondents, supra note 125, at 18 
(supporting the conclusion). 
245 “The wording cited by Picard was proposed by SIPC itself as a “Minor Substantive or Technical 
Amendment[ ] in order to make clear that SIPC’s subrogation rights under the 1970 Act are cumulative 
with whatever rights it may have under other State or Federal laws.”  Hearings on H.R. 8064, 94th 
Cong. 197, 199 (1976) (Memorandum of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation in Regard to 
Certain Comments Concerning H.R. 8064) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re Bernard L. 
Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC., 721 F.3d 54, 75 (2d Cir. 2013).  
246 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 146, at 24. 
247 Id. at 19 (“[The Second Circuit’s decision inhibits] SIPA’s objectives of protecting  securities 
investors and maintaining confidence in U.S. securities markets.”).  
248 Brief in Opposition for HSBC & Unicredit Respondents, supra note 125, at 22 (“SIPA’s 
legislative history does not suggest that subrogation would be a significant factor in maintaining the 
SIPC Fund.”).  “It is, of course, hoped and contemplated that, when the liquidation proceedings are 
completed, SIPC will receive back some moneys from the trustee.”  H.R. Rep. No. 91-1613 (1970), 
reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5254, 5262.   
249 “SIPC is funded by assessments made upon the members of the broker-dealer industry.”  Daniel 
Klein, Annotation, Construction and Application of Term “Customer” in Securities Investor Protection 
Act (SIPA), 52 A.L.R. FED. 2d 491 (2011).  
250 First, it should be noted “holding financial institutions accountable for their conduct” was not a 
stated objective of SIPA.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 146, at 19.   Second, it should be 
noted the SIPC’s job is to front money to customers, and, if it cannot recoup all of that money, it has the 
ability to increase rates on the industry.  Id. at 21. 
251 Id. at 6–7. 
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suddenly incentivize malfeasance.  
Picard also declared because broker-dealer failures are common within the 
Second Circuit, the issues in his writ need resolution by the Court.252  This might 
have been true from 2008 to 2012, but not today.253  This situation has arisen 
primarily because Picard decided to push the boundaries of the law.  The law 
places limits on recovery; this is a risk all investors must bear.254  This area of 
subrogation law has not been seriously questioned since 1978, so to say it suddenly 
needs examination overstates the truth.255  
3. Defendants’ Additional Subrogation Points  
The defendants also raised a few additional points worth mentioning.  First, 
under SIPA, the SIPC does not get reimbursed until the claims of customers are 
satisfied.256  In Picard, all customer claims have yet to be satisfied, so subrogation 
                                                
252 Id. 
253 2012 SEC. INVESTOR PROTECTION CORP. ANN. REP. 6, available at  http://www.sipc.org/Content 
/media/annual-reports/2012-annual-report.PDF.  
254 The SIPC website is clear on this point:  
 
SIPC protection is limited. SIPC only protects the custody function of the broker dealer, 
which means that SIPC works to restore to customers their securities and cash that are in 
their accounts when the brokerage firm liquidation begins.   
SIPC does not protect against the decline in value of your securities. SIPC does not 
protect individuals who are sold worthless stocks and other securities. SIPC does not 
protect claims against a broker for bad investment advice, or for recommending 
inappropriate investments.   
It is important to recognize that SIPC protection is not the same as protection for your 
cash at a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insured banking institution 
because SIPC does not protect the value of any security.   
Investments in the stock market are subject to fluctuations in market value. SIPC was not 
created to protect these risks. That is why SIPC does not bail out investors when the 
value of their stocks, bonds and other investment falls for any reason. Instead, in a 
liquidation, SIPC replaces the missing stocks and other securities when it is possible to 
do so. 
 
What SIPC Protects, SEC. INVESTOR PROTECTION CORP. http://www.sipc.org/for-investors/what-sipc-
protects (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
255 The fact Picard can only point to a few cases, that in the end are not really distinguishable, is a 
sign this area of law is not seriously questioned on legal grounds.  Whether there are strong public 
policy reasons for changing the law is an entirely different matter.   
256  The trustee shall allocate customer property of the debtor as follows:  
 
(A) first, to SIPC in repayment of advances made by SIPC  
. . . . 
(B) second, to customers of such debtor, who shall share ratably in such customer 
property on the basis and to the extent of their respective net equities  
. . . .  
(C) third, to SIPC as subrogee for the claims of customers.   
 
15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2 (2010).  
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is premature.257  Second, they pointed out Picard improperly pleaded the case 
because each individual customer is entitled to different amounts.258  Third, to 
allow this case to proceed would present difficult issues, for example, how would 
proving the reliance of thousands of people be handled?259  The Supreme Court in 
Caplin expressed similar concerns:  
[I]t is extremely doubtful that the trustee and all debenture holders 
would agree on the amount of damages to seek [in a consolidated case], 
or even on the theory on which to  sue.  Moreover, if the indenture 
trustee wins the suit brought by the trustee in reorganization, unless the 
debenture holders are bound by that victory, the proliferation of 
litigation [will result] . . . [not to mention the question of] who [would 
be] bound by any  settlement.” 
Fifth, they pointed out the well-worn idea, despite the appeal of some of 
Picard’s arguments, Congress is the appropriate party to determine public policy.260  
Sixth and finally, they noted adopting Picard’s view would raise more issues than it 
would solve and would throw the law into a state of confusion.261  
B. Bankruptcy Code Section 544  
Picard then turned to the Bankruptcy Code.  Section 544 of the Bankruptcy 
Code states, in pertinent part:  
A trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case . . . the rights 
and powers of,  or may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or 
any obligation incurred by the  debtor  that  is voidable by . . . a creditor 
that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the  commencement of 
                                                
257 “SIPC’s assertion of subrogation rights on behalf of all customers is premature.  SIPA requires 
BLMIS customers’ claims against the estate to be satisfied in full before SIPC may sue as subrogee[—
]and this has not yet happened here.”  Brief in Opposition for HSBC & Unicredit Respondents, supra  
note 125, at 23. 
258 Id. (“[Picard] has treated all supposed subrogors[—]that is, all of the thousands of BLMIS 
customers[—]as an undifferentiated mass.”).  
259 Id.: 
 
Proof of plaintiffs’ individualized reliance is an element of all these claims.  The practical 
case management concerns that this Court expressed in Caplin are magnified where the 
respective liabilities of all these defendants to each of the thousands of BLMIS’s 
customers are sought to be determined through mass subrogation actions by a single 
purported subrogee.   
 
Id. (citations omitted).  
260 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 612 (1983) (“The contours of public policy 
should be determined by Congress, not by judges . . . .”).  
261 Brief in Opposition for HSBC & Unicredit Respondents, supra note 125, at 20 (“[E]ngrafting 
unspecified common law rights of subrogation onto SIPA would throw the law into a state of 
confusion.”); see In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC., 721 F.3d 54, 77 (2d Cir. 2013). 
318 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. VIII:I 
 
the case, and that obtains, at such time and with respect to such credit, 
a judicial lien on all property on which a creditor on a simple contract 
could have  obtained such a judicial lien.262   
Picard argued this language, especially the “rights and powers” language, 
confers standing on a SIPA trustee to bring suit on behalf of creditors.263  He also 
asserted there is a circuit split on the issue.264  The defendants made a strong case 
for why Picard expressly disavowed this issue on appeal;265 however, this case note 
will examine the merits of the argument.266   
1. The Meaning of Section 544  
Picard argued the language of 544 is straightforward and confers standing 
upon him to sue on behalf of creditors.267  Defendants pointed out multiple flaws.  
First, 544, known as the “strong arm” provision, is meant to give the trustee first 
                                                
262 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2012).  
263 Picard does have case law to support the general proposition § 544 confers standing on a trustee 
to pursue some claims that are held by creditors.  However, the devil here is in the details.  Circuits 
around the country have held trustees can assert claims on behalf of creditors under a variety of 
circumstances.  Whether the situations where this is allowed are consistent across the country is 
debatable.  This may be one area where the Supreme Court might want to hear this case, to establish a 
standard as to when § 544 confers standing on a trustee, if at all.  There is a definite split of opinion as 
to a broad and narrow reading of § 544.  See PHELPS & RHODES, supra note 3, at 13.02[2][b].  
264 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 146, at 32–33.  
265 Id.: 
 
Petitioner’s Section 544(a) argument was something of an afterthought, and one he 
quickly cast aside. He raised it only in the JPMorgan and UBS cases in the district court, 
and after that court found it preposterous, he expressly disavowed it in the court of 
appeals.  He explained that on appeal he [would not] . . . pursue the issue of whether he 
could … pursue common law claims as a ‘hypothetical judgment creditor’ under section 
544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.  Relying on this express waiver, the court of appeals 
declined to address the question under Section 544(a) that petitioner now urges upon this 
Court.   
 
Brief for the JPMorgan Respondents and the UBS Respondents in Opposition, In re Bernard L. Madoff 
Inv. Secs. LLC., (No. 13-448) (Dec. 2013), 21 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
266 The Second Circuit did note:  
 
In proceedings before one of the district courts, the Trustee grounded his standing 
argument in large part on Section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which gives a trustee 
the rights of a hypothetical lien creditor.  The court considered this argument at length 
and ultimately rejected it, and the Trustee has abandoned it on appeal. 
 
In re Bernard L. Madoff, 721 F.3d at 66.  In Picard’s reply brief, he asserted “[t]he Trustee raised two 
arguments under Section 544(a): one regarding such ‘general’ claims, and the other regarding common 
law causes of action that belong to BLMIS.  The Trustee specifically declined to raise the latter 
argument on appeal.”  Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 210, at 10. 
267 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 146, at 32–36. 
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priority in a bankruptcy proceeding.268  It is not meant to transfer the rights of 
creditors to the trustee; it is meant to provide a legal mechanism for the trustee to 
recover property for the estate.269  The defendants cited Collier on Bankruptcy: 
“Section 544 is limited to avoidance actions and does not give the trustee standing 
to pursue tort claims that were not the property of the estate at the commencement 
of the case.”270 
Second, the language of 544 talks about “right and powers” that come “at the 
time of the commencement of the case.”271  However, in the Picard case, the 
hypothetical claims against third parties arose before the commencement of the 
bankruptcy case.272  This is exactly what the district court noted: “[A] hypothetical 
judgment creditor who extends credit at the commencement of the liquidation 
would not possess any cause of action or any other right that accrued before he 
extended credit.”273   
Third, the defendants pointed out, when the new Bankruptcy Code was 
passed, Congress made no mention of overruling Caplin,274 and many courts have 
subsequently held the current version of 544 does not supersede Caplin.275  Also, 
as mentioned, the Supreme Court in Caplin practically invited Congress to act and 
                                                
268 Id.: 
 
Section 544(a) is the ‘strong arm clause’ of the Bankruptcy Code, formerly found in 
section 70c of the Bankruptcy Act. Under 544(a) the trustee may avoid a transfer because 
of some defect in the creation of a perfected security interest, including a filing defect. 
Section 544 gives the trustee (and thus the debtor here under Section 1107) the status of a 
hypothetical lien creditor . . . . 
 
In re Johnson, 28 B.R. 292, 295 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983).  In other words, it is meant to defeat secret 
liens or unperfected security interests and give a trustee first priority to recover assets.  
269 Id. at 298 (“Section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code was designed to aid the debtor or trustee of a 
bankruptcy estate in recovering property of the estate.”); Bank of California v. LMJ, Inc. (In re LMJ, 
Inc.), 159 B.R. 926, 928 (D. Nev. 1993) (“The section was designed to aid the trustee in recovering 
properties of the estate. . . .”).  
270 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra note 15, at 5–544; Stanziale v. McGladrey & Pullen, LLP. (In re 
Student Fin. Corp.), 334 B.R. 776, 778 (D. Del. 2005) (“There is ample authority for the contention that 
§ 544 is limited to avoidance actions.”).  
271 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2012). 
272 In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 654 F.3d 229, 231 (2d Cir. 2011) (“In the aftermath of a 
colossal Ponzi scheme conducted by Bernard Madoff over a period of years, Irving H. Picard has been 
appointed, pursuant to the Securities Investor Protection Act as Trustee for the liquidation of Bernard L. 
Madoff Investment Securities LLC.”) (citations omitted).  
273 Picard v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 460 B.R. 84, 93–94 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
274 In re Bradley, 326 F. App’x 838, 839 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Congress considered including a 
provision that would have expressly overruled Caplin but declined to do so.”); In re Ozark Rest. Equip. 
Co., Inc., 816 F.2d 1222, 1227–28 (8th Cir. 1987) (“As originally proposed by the House, Section 544 
was to contain a subsection (c), which was intended to overrule Caplin.  It is extremely noteworthy, 
however, that this provision was deleted before promulgation of the final version of Section 544.”).  
275 In re Bradley, 326 F. App’x at 839 (“We agree with our sister circuit that Congress’s adoption of 
the “strong-arm clause,” 11 U.S.C. § 544(a), did not supersede Caplin’s holding that a trustee lacks 
authority to assert a claim against a third party that does not comprise part of the bankruptcy estate.”).  
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provide standing to a trustee:  
Congress could determine that the trustee in a reorganization [is] so 
well situated for bringing suits against [a third-party] indenture trustees 
that he should be permitted to do  so.  In this event, Congress might also 
determine [a] trustee’s action [is] exclusive, or  that it should be brought 
as a class action on behalf of all debenture holders, or perhaps  even 
that the debenture holders should have the option of suing on their own 
or having  the trustee sue on their behalf.  Any number of alternatives 
are available.276  
The fact Congress did not take this invitation is telling.  In sum, the weight of 
authority indicates the trustee does not have standing to bring claims belonging 
solely to creditors under 544.277  As the district court said: the “problems with 
petitioner’s [544] theory are indeed legion.”278 
2. Circuit Split 
Picard cited Koch Refining v. Farmers Union Central Exchange, Inc.279 and 
In re American Cartage, Inc.280 for the proposition a trustee can bring claims on 
behalf of creditors under 544, as long as the claims are common to all creditors.281  
This issue has been cited by some as a true circuit split.282  However, in Koch and 
Cartage, the trustees asserted claims common to the creditors and the debtor, not 
just creditors personally.  The issue boils down to the line between a claim that is 
general and a claim that is personal.  
In Koch, the trustee sued the debtor’s shareholders, on behalf of both the 
debtor and creditors.283  The court held the trustee could bring claims “general and 
common to the corporation and creditors.”284  Furthermore, the court noted, as the 
injuries to the debtor were the primary focus of the litigation and the claims of 
creditors were secondary, the case could proceed with the trustee at the helm.285  
                                                
276 Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. of New York, 406 U.S. 416, 434 (1972).  
277 In re Rare Coin Galleries of Am., Inc., 862 F.2d 896, 900 (1st Cir. 1988) (“The trustee, however, 
has no power to assert any claim on behalf of the creditors when the cause of action belongs solely to 
them.”).  
278 Brief for the JPMorgan Respondents & the UBS Respondents in Opposition, supra note 265, at 
24.  
279 831 F.2d 1339, 1341 (7th Cir. 1987) 
280 656 F.3d 82, 87 (1st Cir. 2011).  
281 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 146, at 32–33.  
282 PHELPS & RHODES, supra note 3.  
283 Koch, 831 F.2d at 1350.  
284 Id. at 1349. 
285 Id. at 1354 (“The complaint of the oil companies alleges no injury to them by the named 
defendants.  They have sought a declaration that the Member-Owners harmed ECI, and that the 
Member-Owners’ manipulation of ECI had a detrimental effect on them; this secondary or resultant 
effect is not a sufficient showing that they themselves were injured by the Member-Owners.”). 
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Picard cited a line of this opinion in which the court said the trustee can bring 
claims as a representative of creditors.286  However, Picard failed to note a 
qualification preceding the quote: “[T]he trustee has no standing to bring personal 
claims of creditors.  A cause of action is ‘personal’ if the claimant himself is 
harmed and no other claimant or creditor has an interest in the cause.”287  
Assuming the claims at issue in Picard cannot be characterized as general to all 
customers, then defendants have the better argument. 
Cartage involved a suit brought by the trustee of a debtor against a former 
manager of the debtor.288  The Cartage court noted, though “the trustee lacks 
standing to pursue claims that belong personally to the creditors . . . [i]f the claim is 
a general one, it is property of the estate.”289  The court summarized the distinction: 
“[W]hen the alleged injury to a creditor is indirect or derives solely from an injury 
to the debtor, the claim is general.”290  In the present case, the claims were by no 
means general to all creditors.  As the district court noted, claims were brought “on 
behalf of thousands of customers against third-party financial institutions for their 
handling of varying amounts[,]” and this conduct “could not have harmed all 
customers in the same way.”291  In sum, defendants appear to have the better 
argument here, yet the Court may want to resolve this issue.   
C. Equity and Public Policy 
Picard’s final arguments of equity and public policy were repeated from his 
Second Circuit argument.292  However, defendants’ responses are worth 
mentioning.  First, they point out a trustee’s powers to recover money for the estate 
are not limited, because a trustee has fraudulent transfer suits as one of many 
means for recovering property for the estate.293  Because a statute of limitations has 
run or an affirmative defense is available is a function of Congress’s decision to 
                                                
286 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 146. 
287 Id. at 1348.  
288 In re Am. Cartage, Inc., 656 F.3d 82, 86 (1st Cir. 2011) (“City filed a state court action against 
Allied and Zoll.  Posturing itself as the debtor’s successor in interest, it alleged that Zoll, while working 
for the debtor and acting in concert with Allied, had converted assets, interfered with contractual 
relationships, breached fiduciary duties, and conspired to commit these acts.”).  
289 Id. at 90 (citations omitted).  
290 Id. 
291 Brief for the JPMorgan Respondents & the UBS Respondents in Opposition, supra note 265, at 
25.  
292 There are many who side with the Trustee: “It is the defrauded victims and creditors who stand 
to lose if the Supreme Court says no.”  Kathy B. Phelps, Jumping Through Hoops to Get Trustee 
Standing in Ponzi Scheme Cases, THE PONZI BLOG SCHEME (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.theponzibook. 
blogspot.com/search?updated-max=2014-01-31T15:05:00-08:00&max-results=2&start=2&by-
date=false. 
293 Brief in Opposition for HSBC & Unicredit Respondents, supra note 125, at 22 (“[P]etitioner 
continues to pursue fraudulent transfer and preference claims (under both federal and state law) against 
each of the respondents herein.”).  
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balance the interests of trustees and defendants, and to ensure plaintiffs do not sit 
on their rights.294  It is not an inherent flaw in a court’s interpretation of the law.  
Furthermore, the limitations period serves the important function of creating 
predictability in the marketplace so good-faith companies and individuals can 
know, a certain number of years after a transaction, they are free of fraudulent 
transfer litigation.  To adopt Picard’s reading of the law would render the statute of 
limitations superfluous in many cases.   
Second, the defendants pointed out there are serious public policy reasons for 
rejecting Picard’s arguments.295  If a trustee were allowed to manage this litigation, 
customers’ choice and freedom to run their own cases would be gone.  Indeed, the 
defendants cite a number of cases in which customers are currently bringing their 
own claims, which might not be possible if Picard prevails.296  Third, no matter 
how strong Picard’s public policy arguments, “Congress has not yet indicated even 
a scintilla of an intention to [confer standing upon a trustee to sue third parties on 
behalf of customers], and that such a policy decision must be left to Congress and 
not to the judiciary.”297 
Fourth, it is true the SIPC was created to protect investors, but the framework 
created was not boundless.  The SIPA provisions were made to provide priority 
status to customers and to help them get their money back faster than in traditional 
bankruptcy.  The goal was not to get customers their money back at all costs, 
including undermining predictability in the securities industry.  Defendants’ case is 
well reasoned and supported by the weight of authority.298   
VI. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION 
Picard’s arguments are long on customer-centric public policy but short on 
the law.299  Despite the emotional appeal of his case to go after large banks, who 
themselves lost money in the Madoff scandal, the law does not allow it.  Congress 
                                                
294 Statutes of Limitations, PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) P 3130 (C.C.H.), 2009 WL 4036099 (2012) 
(“The rationale behind statutes of limitations is to protect both the courts and defendants from the 
difficulty of adjudicating and defending stale claims.  Evidence disappears, potential witnesses leave the 
jurisdiction, and memory fades.  Timeliness of a claim helps to ensure that substantial justice is 
rendered and that verdicts are based on all relevant evidence.  Moreover, statutes of limitations promote 
efficient use of resources by allowing defendants to direct their time and energies to immediate concerns 
rather than to remote actions.  Further, a statute of limitations implicitly indicates a court’s disapproval 
of one who ‘sleeps on his rights.’”). 
295 Brief for the JPMorgan Respondents & the UBS Respondents in Opposition, supra note 265, at 
26. 
296 Id. 
297 Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. of New York, 406 U.S. 416, 434 (1972).  
298 Birney & Searles, supra note 59, at 83 (“It is difficult to criticize the merits of Judge Rakoff’s 
reasoning.  As a matter of statutory interpretation and construction, SIPA does tend to yield the 
conclusion that a trustee’s powers are “cabined by title 11.”).  
299 This is evidenced by the fact he has lost his case against financial institutions for aiding and 
abetting fraud at every stage thus far.   
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passed SIPA to protect and bolster confidence in the securities industry,300 so why 
would it have also used SIPA to create a new cause of action against the industry 
and not even mention it in the legislative history?301  Furthermore, even if the 
language were viewed as ambiguous, which it is not, it is not the role of the courts 
or a zealous trustee to legislate and create public policy.302  Also, why would 
Congress have created overlapping systems for trustees and customers to bring the 
exact same claims, based on the same facts, against a financial institution?  Finally, 
Picard grasps at a small number of cases that have created small exceptions for 
trustee standing, but none are applicable to his case, and none create a real circuit 
split worthy of Supreme Court review.  
In addition, Picard’s arguments ignore the impact his views would have on 
the securities industry.  Costs of litigation would skyrocket for financial firms, and 
this cost would certainly be passed on to customers.  Furthermore, for fear of 
constantly being sued for “aiding and abetting” fraud they had no knowledge of, 
financial institutions would be limited in their ability to plan for the future.  
Finally, financial institutions might even tighten their credit lending practices, for 
fear of being exposed to additional layers of risk.  
Even if denying Picard’s claims somehow “thwarts the ‘customer protection’ 
goals of SIPA and . . . negatively impacts customers of Madoff Securities who may 
not have the means or ability to advance common law claims on their own 
behalf,’”303 the law does not provide for Picard’s positions.  Additionally, 
customers are free to bring their claims, individually or as a class.  To adopt 
Picard’s views would not only fundamentally alter securities and bankruptcy law, it 
would create a new type of ill-defined class action against financial institutions.  
The Supreme Court should affirm the Second Circuit or simply not hear this case.  
If Congress feels this is an issue, it should legislate.  However, despite the outcry 
of many, Congress has chosen to leave the law as it is, probably because the law 
works. 
 
                                                
300 When President Nixon signed SIPA into law in 1970, he remarked the “functioning of the 
securities industry is a key element in providing the means for continued growth of American business 
and the economy of this country.”  Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, Richard Nixon: Statement on 
Signing the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Dec. 30, 
1970), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2870. 
301 Richard W. Murphy, Separation of Powers and the Horizontal Force of Precedent, 78 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1075, 1087–88 (2003) (“[J]udges cannot legitimately make new law according to their 
“private sentiments” for two reasons: (1) they simply lack the legislative power to do so; and (2) 
permitting judges to legislate introduces instability and uncertainty into the law.”).  
302 Birney & Searles, supra note 59, at 31 (“[C]onferring standing upon a SIPA trustee to pursue 
certain causes of action against third parties would clearly advance SIPA’s primary goal of affording 
greater protections for the customers of failed firms by maximizing their potential recoveries.”).  
303 Frankel, supra note 220 (“[T]he Supreme Court wants to understand all of the policy 
implications of the trustee’s arguments.”).  
